The Continuing Vitality of Ravin v. State: Alaskans Still Have a Constitutional Right to Possess Marijuana in the Privacy of Their Homes by Brandeis, Jason
BRANDEIS_V8.0 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2012 7:20 PM 
 
THE CONTINUING VITALITY OF 
RAVIN V. STATE: ALASKANS STILL 
HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO POSSESS MARIJUANA IN THE 
PRIVACY OF THEIR HOMES 
JASON BRANDEIS 
INTRODUCTION 
Alaska has a unique personal-use marijuana law that has sparked 
legal debate for nearly forty years. In 1975, in Ravin v. State,1 the Alaska 
Supreme Court held that the Alaska Constitution’s right to privacy 
protects an adult’s ability to use and possess a small amount of 
marijuana in the home for personal use.2 The Alaska Supreme Court 
thereby became the first—and remains the only—state or federal court 
to announce a constitutional privacy right that protects some level of 
marijuana use and possession.3 With that landmark decision, the court 
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 1.  537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975). 
 2.   See id. at 511. (holding that “possession of marijuana by adults at home 
for personal use is constitutionally protected”). 
 3.  Andrew S. Winters, Ravin Revisited: Do Alaskans Still Have a Constitutional 
Right to Possess Marijuana in the Privacy of Their Homes?, 15 ALASKA L. REV. 315, 
319–20 (1998). Many state courts have declined to follow or have outright 
rejected Ravin. See, e.g., State v. Mallan, 950 P.2d 178, 184 (Haw. 1998) (“[T]he 
purported right to possess and use marijuana is not a fundamental right and a 
compelling state interest is not required.”); Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil 
Co., 589 A.2d 170, 176 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (“There is no right in New 
Jersey to the private use of controlled dangerous substances by adults in their 
homes.”); People v. Shepard, 409 N.E.2d 840, 843 (N.Y. 1980) (per curiam) 
(“Nothing would be more inappropriate than for us to prematurely remove 
marihuana from the Legislature’s consideration by classifying its personal 
possession as a constitutionally protected right.”); State v. Beecraft, No. 
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planted the seeds of a jurisprudential philosophy that would grow to 
place a primacy on individual privacy rights and would forever wed the 
concepts of privacy and marijuana in Alaska constitutional lore. 
Now in the fourth decade since Ravin was issued, the legal status of 
marijuana4 in Alaska sits in an odd position. Personal use and 
possession of marijuana in the privacy of the home remain protected by 
Ravin and its progeny, but the current Alaska criminal code prohibits 
possession of any amount of marijuana,5 as does the federal Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA).6 Despite these statutory bans, Alaska courts 
continue to recognize that “not all marijuana possession is a crime in 
Alaska.”7 This tension between state court decisions and state and 
federal statutes continues to raise questions as to the rights of the 
individual, the responsibilities of law enforcement, and the continuing 
vitality of the Ravin decision. 
 
2006AP982-CR, 2006 WL 3842171, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2006) (“Beecraft 
does not explain why the Alaska court’s construction of that provision would be 
relevant in Wisconsin.”). A number of other state and federal courts have held 
that there is no privacy interest in marijuana use. E.g., Nat’l Org. for the Reform 
of Marijuana Laws v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 123, 132 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that the 
prohibition of the possession of marijuana does not infringe an individual’s 
constitutionally protected right to privacy under the U.S. Constitution); see also 
Winters, supra note 3, at 320 (“[C]ourts in states other than Alaska have 
considered whether their state constitutions protect marijuana possession, but 
none has come to the same conclusion as Ravin”); Kuromiya v. United States, 37 
F. Supp.2d 717, 726–28 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (discussing the rejection of any federal 
right to marijuana possession). 
 4.   “Marijuana” is defined by Alaska statute as: 
[T]he seeds, and leaves, buds, and flowers of the plant (genus) 
Cannabis, whether growing or not; it does not include the resin or oil 
extracted from any part of the plants, or any compound, manufacture, 
salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation from the resin or oil, including 
hashish, hashish oil, and natural or synthetic tetrahydrocannabinol; it 
does not include the stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the stalks, 
oil or cake made from the seeds of the plant, any other compound, 
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the stalks, 
fiber, oil or cake, or the sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of 
germination. 
ALASKA STAT. §  11.71.900(14) (2012). 
 5.   §§ 11.71.040–11.71.060.  However, Alaska law provides an affirmative 
defense for medical marijuana use that complies with the requirements of the 
state medical marijuana act. See § 17.37.030 (“A patient, primary caregiver, or 
alternate caregiver registered with the department under this chapter has an 
affirmative defense to a criminal prosecution related to marijuana to the extent 
provided in AS 11.71.090.”); § 11.71.090 (2010) (A defendant  maintains an 
affirmative defense so long as the patient was registered under AS 17.37 and the 
use complied with the requirements of AS 17.37”). 
 6.  21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012). 
 7.  State v. Crocker, 97 P.3d 93, 94 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). 
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Such confusion is not new or unexpected. In a 1998 Alaska Law 
Review note, Andrew S. Winters asked “Do Alaskans still have a 
constitutional right to possess marijuana in the privacy of their homes?”8 
Winters correctly concluded that Ravin “should be respected as good 
law.”9 Much happened since that note was written: Alaska voters 
approved a medical marijuana law,10 Alaska courts issued several 
opinions concerning personal marijuana use,11 and the state legislature 
attempted to recriminalize all marijuana possession,12 resulting in high-
profile litigation13 and leaving statutes on the books that run directly 
counter to Ravin.14 Additionally, the recent uptick in the number of other 
jurisdictions that have passed medical marijuana laws,15 or have 
otherwise decriminalized or legalized marijuana,16 has renewed interest 
 
 8.  See Winters, supra note 3, at 315 (identifying the purpose of the article as 
reviewing Ravin and determining whether it remains good law in Alaska). 
 9.  See id. at 316 (stating that the factual premises set out in Ravin “are in 
fact still valid and . . . should still be respected as good law.”). 
 10.  Food and Drugs—Medical Use of Marijuana § 4, 1999, Alaska Sess. Laws 
Ch. 37, 8–10. 
 11.  See, e.g., Walker v. State, 991 P.2d 799, 803 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) 
(construing Ravin to apply only to small amounts of marijuana and holding that 
the legislature could validly prohibit possession of eight ounces of marijuana); 
Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538, 544–45 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003), reh’g denied, 83 P.3d 545 
(Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (holding that adults may possess less than four ounces of 
marijuana in the home and for personal use); Crocker, 97 P.3d at 98 (holding a 
warrant to search a person’s home for evidence of marijuana possession is 
inappropriate unless the State’s warrant application establishes probable cause 
to believe that the person’s possession of marijuana exceeds the scope of the 
possession that is constitutionally protected under Ravin). 
 12.   H.B. 149, 24th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Alaska 2006). 
 13.  See, e.g., State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 373 (Alaska 2009) 
(Carpeneti, J., dissenting) (referring to the case as “high-profile”). 
 14.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060 (2012) (criminalizing the possession of 
any amount of marijuana). 
 15.  Eighteen states and the District of Columbia now permit medical 
marijuana use. 18 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG, 
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 
(last updated Nov. 16, 2012). Six of those medical marijuana laws were enacted 
in 2010 or later. Id. Four other states have pending legislation or upcoming ballot 
initiatives to legalize medical marijuana. 4 States with Pending Legislation to 
Legalize Medical Marijuana, PROCON.ORG, http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org 
/view.resource.php?resourceID=002481 (last updated Nov. 7, 2012). 
 16.  In November 2012, voters in Colorado and Washington approved ballot 
initiatives legalizing recreational  marijuana use in those states. See Jack Healy, 
Voters Ease Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legal Questions Remain, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 8, 2012, at P15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/ 
politics/marijuana-laws-eased-in-colorado-and-washington.html. Fourteen 
other states and a number of municipalities have decriminalized the possession 
of marijuana for non-medical purposes. See Places That Have Decriminalized Non-
Medical Cannabis In The United States, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/Places_that_have_decriminalized_non-medical_cannabis_in_the_United_States 
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in the relationship between state laws that permit some marijuana use 
and the CSA, which still completely bans it.17 It is therefore time to ask, 
and answer, that question again. 
This Article seeks to clarify the current status of Alaska law 
governing personal use and possession of marijuana and to identify the 
future precedential value of Ravin. The Article is broken into four main 
parts. Part I briefly chronicles the history and development of Alaska’s 
personal-use marijuana law, focusing on major court decisions and key 
pieces of legislation involving the intersection of the right of privacy and 
marijuana. Part II explains how ripeness, prosecutorial discretion, and 
stare decisis combine to insulate Ravin from being easily overturned. 
Part III discusses ongoing issues related to administering and 
implementing Ravin, including the roles the state courts and legislature 
continue to play in defining the scope of personal use of marijuana, the 
ability of law enforcement officials to investigate suspected marijuana 
grow operations based on the perception of marijuana odor, and the 
importance of ensuring objective review of the science underlying 
marijuana policy in Alaska. Part IV examines how the rights protected 
under Ravin lawfully exist in light of the CSA’s marijuana ban. The 
Article concludes that Ravin retains its vitality and should be respected 
as good law unless and until the Alaska Supreme Court rules otherwise. 
I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF ALASKA’S 
PERSONAL-USE MARIJUANA LAW 
A. The 1970s and 1980s: Ravin and the Legislative Response 
In August 1972 the Alaska Constitution was amended to include an 
explicit right of privacy.18 That December, Irwin Ravin was arrested and 
charged with violating an Alaska statue prohibiting possession of 
 
(last modified Nov. 20, 2012). 
 17.  See generally Robert A. Mikos, The Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana 
and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 
1423 (2009) (“I argue that states retain both de jure and de facto power to exempt 
medical marijuana from criminal sanctions in spite of Congress’s 
uncompromising—and clearly constitutional—ban on the drug.”); Robert A. 
Mikos, Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New Approach to Medical 
Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 634–35 (2011) (“The question now is 
whether the federal government will allow the states to construct a sensible 
regulatory regime free of federal interference or whether it will instead wage an 
ongoing guerilla-style campaign against medical marijuana—one with many 
casualties, but with no real victory possible.”). 
 18.   “The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be 
infringed. The legislature shall implement this section.” ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 
22. 
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marijuana.19 
Ravin challenged the constitutionality of the law, arguing that his 
conduct was protected by both the state and federal right of privacy.20 
Ravin’s challenge asserted that the available scientific evidence showed 
that marijuana was “a relatively innocuous substance” and if marijuana 
was not all that harmful, the state could not prove that it had a sufficient 
interest in prohibiting its use and possession.21 The Alaska Supreme 
Court agreed with him to a certain extent. In Ravin v. State, the court 
identified a limited right to possess marijuana within the sphere of the 
Alaska Constitution’s broader right to privacy.22 The court held that 
“possession of marijuana by adults at home for personal use is 
constitutionally protected”23 because the state could not “meet its 
substantial burden and show that the proscription of marijuana in the 
home is supportable by achievement of a legitimate state interest.”24 
The court did not reach this conclusion lightly. The justices pored 
through scientific evidence on marijuana use and its health and social 
effects and found “no firm evidence that marijuana, as presently used in 
this country, is generally a danger to the user or to others.”25 Weighing 
“the relative insignificance of marijuana consumption as a health 
problem[,]”26 the importance of respecting the sanctity of the home,27 
 
 19.  Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 496 (Alaska 1975). 
 20.  Id. The court dismissed Ravin’s arguments that the statute also violated 
the state and federal equal protection guarantees. Id. at 512. 
 21.  Id. at 497. 
 22.  See id. at 504 (protecting the possession of a substance like marijuana in a 
“purely personal, non-commercial context in the home”). The Alaska Supreme 
Court rejected Ravin’s federal privacy claim. Id. at 500. 
 23.  Id. at 511. The court spoke only of possession of marijuana in amounts 
indicative of non-commercial “personal use,” but did not elaborate on what 
constituted a personal amount. Id. It has since become common practice for 
Alaska courts to refer to a non-commercial personal amount of marijuana as a 
“small” quantity of marijuana. See, e.g., State v. Native Vill. of Tanana, 249 P.3d 
734, 748 (Alaska 2011) (“The plaintiffs . . . had challenged a newly enacted 
statute criminalizing the possession of small amounts of marijuana, arguing the 
statute was unconstitutional under Ravin v. State.”); State v. ACLU of Alaska, 
204 P.3d 364, 366 n.4 (Alaska 2009) (“Alaskans have a fundamental right to 
privacy in their homes and protecting the possession by adults of small amounts 
of marijuana in the home for personal use.”); Hotrum v. State, 130 P.3d 965, 967 
(Alaska Ct. App. 2006) (“the right of an adult to possess a small amount of 
marijuana in his home for personal use”); Walker v. State, 991 P.2d 799, 801 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (Coats, C.J., concurring) (discussing the right to possess 
“small quantities of marijuana in the home” for “personal use”); Cleland v. State, 
759 P.2d 553, 557 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (“Alaska’s residents enjoy a right of 
privacy which extends to protect their right to possess small quantities of 
marijuana for personal use in their homes . . . .”). 
 24.  Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504. 
 25.  Id. at 508. 
 26.  Id. at 511. 
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and the fact that personal autonomy is uniquely prized in Alaska,28 the 
court did not see the requisite “close and substantial relationship” 
between the state’s asserted interest (protecting the public from the ills 
of marijuana use) and the means chosen to advance that interest (a state 
law prohibiting all possession and use of marijuana).29 A blanket 
marijuana prohibition simply went too far—the available scientific 
evidence did not “justify intrusions into the rights of adults in the 
privacy of their homes.”30 The state’s marijuana ban was also out of line 
with what the court described as a basic tenet of a free society: “the 
authority of the state to exert control over the individual extends only to 
activities of the individual which affect others or the public at large.”31 
The court did, however, recognize that marijuana use was not 
completely harmless or without risk.32 The state had a legitimate, 
achievable interest in proscribing marijuana use among drivers, whose 
ability to safely operate a vehicle would be lowered, and among 
“adolescents who may not be equipped with the maturity to handle the 
experience prudently. . . .”33 Those factors, combined with the narrow 
scope of the decision itself, meant that the state could still regulate and 
prohibit most types of marijuana activity without running afoul of the 
right to privacy. Ravin did not extend to protect possession or use of 
marijuana in public, driving under the influence of marijuana, buying or 
 
 27.  See id. at 503–04 (identifying the home as a place where “privacy 
receives special protection” and noting that the privacy amendment to the 
Alaska Constitution “was intended to give recognition and protection to the 
home”). An odd twist to Ravin is that Irwin Ravin’s case began when he was 
arrested in his car during a traffic stop, not in the privacy of his home. Susan 
Orlansky & Jeffrey M. Feldman, Justice Rabinowitz and Personal Freedom: Evolving 
A Constitutional Framework, 15 ALASKA L. REV 1, 10 n.53 (1998). But neither the 
opinion nor the record before the Alaska Supreme Court “disclose[d] any facts 
as to the situs of Ravin’s arrest and his alleged possession of marijuana.” Ravin, 
537 P.2d at 513. The court ultimately remanded the case so those facts could be 
developed.  Id. 
 28.  See id. at 504 (noting Alaska’s unique legacy of individuality and self-
reliance). 
 29.   See id. at 511 (“[W]e do not believe that the potential harm generated by 
drivers under the influence of marijuana, standing alone, creates a close and 
substantial relationship between the public welfare and control of or ingestion of 
marijuana or possession of it in the home for personal use.”). 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. This respect for individual rights, and the belief that individuals 
should be trusted to make their own decisions, is all the more impressive 
considering the court’s feelings about drug use in general. The Ravin court was 
very candid with its anti-drug message. Id. at 511. 
 32.  See id. at 508 (“The one significant risk in use of marijuana which we do 
find established to a reasonable degree of certainty is the effect of marijuana 
intoxication on driving.”). 
 33.  Id. at 511. 
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selling marijuana, possession of marijuana in an amount indicative of an 
intent to sell, or any marijuana activity involving minors.34 
More importantly than its distinctive approach to marijuana 
possession, Ravin was a historic decision because it was the first Alaska 
Supreme Court opinion to meaningfully define the scope of the Alaska 
Constitution’s right to privacy.35 Ravin established the principle that the 
Alaska Constitution provides greater protection for individual privacy 
rights than does the United States Constitution, a principle that has 
become a cornerstone of Alaska jurisprudence.36 
Simultaneous with Ravin, the Alaska Legislature decriminalized 
marijuana.37 The new law allowed adults to possess one ounce or less of 
 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  The Alaska Supreme Court previously discussed the privacy 
amendment in Gray v. State, which also involved a challenge to the state’s 
marijuana laws. 525 P.2d 524, 528 (Alaska 1974) (holding that the right to privacy 
“clearly . . . shields the ingestion of food, beverages, or other substances” from 
legislative interference). However, the court remanded for an evidentiary 
hearing on the health effects of marijuana. Id. The court also noted that the 
pending Ravin opinion could control Gray’s case. Id. at 528 n.16. 
 36.  See, e.g., State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 171 P.3d 577, 581 
(Alaska 2007) (“Because this right to privacy is explicit, its protections are 
necessarily more robust and ‘broader in scope’ than those of the implied federal 
right to privacy.”); Anchorage Police Dep’t Employees Ass’n v. Municipality of 
Anchorage, 24 P.3d 547, 550 (Alaska 2001) (“We have held that both of these 
provisions afford broader protection than their federal counterparts.”); Valley 
Hosp. Ass’n, Inc. v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 968 (Alaska 1997) 
(“[The Alaska Constitution] provides more protection of individual privacy 
rights than the United States Constitution.”); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Privacy 
and the Alaska Constitution: Failing to Fulfill the Promise, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 29, 31 
(2003) (“The Alaska Supreme Court continues, at times, to provide greater 
protection for privacy rights under the Alaska Constitution than under the 
United States Constitution.”); Orlansky & Feldman, supra note 27, at 26 (“Justice 
Rabinowitz treated the adoption of article I, section 22 as underscoring the 
importance of the right of privacy in Alaska and supporting adoption of stricter 
controls on warrantless government action than is required under the federal 
Constitution.”); Michael Schwaiger, Understanding the Unoriginal: Indeterminant 
Originalism and Independent Interpretation of the Alaska Constitution, 22 ALASKA L. 
REV. 293, 295–96 (2005) (“Because the Federal Constitution provides a sturdy 
floor for civil rights, the Alaska Supreme Court’s independent interpretation of 
the Alaska Constitution based on Alaska’s local constitutional heritage can serve 
to safeguard rights beyond federal constitutional protections.”). 
 37.  This legislation first became law on June 5, 1975, about a week after 
Ravin was issued on May 27, 1975. See Act of 1975 § 1, 1975 Alaska Sess. Law Ch. 
110, 2 (“Actual effective date: September 2, 1975”). However, the legislature first 
submitted the bill on May 16, 1975, 11 days before the Ravin decision was 
announced. ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 9th Leg., 1st Sess. 1122 (May 16, 1975); ALASKA 
H. JOURNAL, 9th Leg., 1st Sess. 1235 (May 16, 1975). Thus the legislature could 
not have taken the final Ravin ruling into account when it revised the state’s 
marijuana laws—in fact, the Ravin court even pointed out that the act had 
recently passed through the state legislature when it was drafting its opinion. 
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marijuana in public and any amount of marijuana for personal use in 
private with no criminal penalty.38 Such possession would only subject 
the offender to a “civil fine of not more than $100.”39 But this still 
presented a constitutional conflict as conduct that Ravin declared as 
shielded from government intrusion remained subject to state-
sanctioned consequences through imposition of a civil fine.40 
In 1982, the Legislature resolved the conflict by revising the state 
criminal code to omit any civil or criminal penalty for an adult’s 
possession of less than four ounces of marijuana for personal use in the 
home.41 This revision fully embraced and codified the Ravin decision.42 
B. The 1990s: Ballot Initiatives, Recriminalization, and Medical 
Marijuana 
The statutory decriminalization of marijuana in Alaska lasted only 
eight years. At the November 6, 1990 statewide general election, Alaska 
voters faced a ballot initiative that would make all marijuana possession 
in Alaska illegal.43 The language of the initiative was explicit and “in no 
 
Ravin, 537 P.2d at 513 n.75 (“The Alaska legislature have also recently passed a 
bill which would decriminalize possession of marijuana in certain contexts.”). 
The 1975 legislation therefore should not be viewed solely as a reaction to Ravin, 
but rather as evidence that the legislature and the courts were proceeding along 
similar tracks with respect to their views on privacy and marijuana. 
 38.  See Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538, 541 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (outlining the 
specific parameters of the legislation). 
 39.  See id. 
 40.  Governor Jay Hammond explained that the new state statutes “were 
more restrictive than the law articulated by the Supreme Court” in his decision 
to allow the bill to become law without his signature. ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 9th 
Leg., 1st Sess. 1463–64 (May 16, 1975). Regardless of the conflict with Ravin, 
Governor Hammond was still not a supporter of the Bill; he did not believe that 
it was in the public’s best interest to expand the use of marijuana. Id. at 1463 . 
 41.  See Noy, 83 P.3d at 542 (“[F]ollowing the legislature’s 1982 revision of the 
marijuana laws, there was no penalty (whether criminal or civil) for possessing 
less than four ounces of marijuana in one’s home for personal use.”). Under the 
1982 legislation, criminal penalties were reinstated for most other types of 
marijuana possession. See id. at 541–42 (“Under the newly enacted AS 
11.71.050(a)(3)(E), possession of eight ounces of marijuana was made a class A 
misdemeanor.  Under the newly enacted AS 11.71.060(a)(4), possession of four 
ounces or more of marijuana was made a class B misdemeanor. The legislature 
also made it a violation to possess any amount of marijuana in a public place.”). 
 42.  See Brown v. Ely, 14 P.3d 257, 260 (Alaska 2000) (“In 1982 the Alaska 
legislature codified Ravin by amending AS 11.71.060 to legalize possession of up 
to four ounces of marijuana in a private place.”); Walker v. State, 991 P.2d 799, 
802–03 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (specifying the purpose of the law was to codify 
the amount indicative of personal use so that citizens would know the amount 
protected by Ravin). 
 43. Initiatives Appearing on the Ballot in Alaska, STATE OF ALASKA DIV. OF 
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uncertain terms” meant to wipe out the rights provided under Ravin.44 
This highly-contested political issue, strongly supported by the federal 
government, garnered “a good deal of publicity” in the months leading 
up to the election.45 
The 1990 Initiative passed by a comfortable margin and the Alaska 
Statutes were amended to once again criminalize all marijuana 
possession.46 Under the revised statutes, any possession of less than 
eight ounces of marijuana was a Class B misdemeanor.47 The exception 
for possession of less than four ounces of marijuana was eliminated. 
Penalties for possession of larger quantities of marijuana remained 
unchanged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ELECTIONS, 2 (2012), http://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/forms/H26.pdf (last 
revised May 2, 2012) (Initiative number 88MARI, “Relating to the 
Recriminalization of Marijuana”); Alaska Marijuana Criminalization Initiative 
(1990), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Alaska_Marijuana 
_Criminalization_Initiative_(1990) (last updated July 12, 2012). 
 44.  Winters, supra note 3, at 326. 
 45.  Id. at 326 n.71; Richard Mauer, Recriminalization - Drug War, Right To 
Privacy Face Off, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 28, 1990, at M17 (“the War on 
Drugs has come to Alaska”); Bennett Urges Alaska Voters to Ban Marijuana, L.A. 
TIMES, October 27, 1990, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1990-10-
27/news/mn-2912_1_alaska-constitution (“Drug policy director William J. 
Bennett wrapped up his two-day anti-marijuana campaign in Alaska’s two 
biggest cities Friday, beseeching Alaskans to ban cannabis in the Last Frontier.”). 
 46.  See Initiatives Appearing on the Ballot in Alaska, STATE OF ALASKA DIVISION 
OF ELECTIONS, 2 (2012), http://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/forms/H26.pdf 
(last revised May 2, 2012) (105,263 Alaska voters (54.3%) voted “yes” and only 
88,644 (45.7%) opposed it). 
 47.  Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538, 542 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003). 
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Statutory Criminal Penalties For Simple Marijuana Possession In 
Alaska (1982 and 1991)48 
 
Despite this seemingly conclusive election, the constitutionality of 
the 1990 Initiative was “questioned widely” because it purported to 
eliminate the limited right of personal marijuana possession protected 
under Ravin.57  This set up a legal question that would remain formally 
unanswered for over a decade: did the 1990 Initiative actually 
“overrule” the Ravin decision?58 
An initiative regarding marijuana appeared on the ballot again in 
 
 48.  This table is not inclusive of all marijuana-related crimes; it lists only 
penalties applicable to simple possession under state law. 
 49.  See Noy, 83 P.3d at 542 (summarizing the parameters of the 1982 
legislation). 
 50.  ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060(a)(4) (1982) (current version at ALASKA STAT. §  
11.71.060 (2012)). 
 51.   § 11.71.050(a)(3)(E) (1982) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.050 
(2012)). 
 52.  §  11.71.040(a)(3)(F) (1982) (current version at ALASKA STAT. §  11.71.040 
(2012)). 
 53.  §  11.71.060(a)(1) (1992) (current version at ALASKA STAT. §  11.71.060 
(2012)). 
 54.  § 11.71.060(a)(1), (2) (1992) (current version at ALASKA STAT. §  11.71.060 
(2012)). 
 55.  § 11.71.050(a)(3)(E) (1992) (current version at ALASKA STAT. §  11.71.050 
(2012)). 
 56.  § 11.71.040(a)(3)(F) (1992) (current version at ALASKA STAT. §  11.71.040 
(2012)). 
 57.  See Orlansky & Feldman, supra note 27, at 11 n.68 (“The constitutionality 
of the initiative has been questioned widely, but the Alaska Supreme Court has 
not had occasion to rule on the issue.”). 
 58.  See Brown v. Ely, 14 P.3d 257, 260 (Alaska 2000) (“We have yet to 
address any conflict between Ravin and AS 11.71.060.”); see also Eric A. Johnson, 
Harm to the “Fabric of Society” as a Basis for Regulating Otherwise Harmless Conduct: 
Notes on a Theme from Ravin v. State, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 41, 41 n.3 (2003) 
(noting that as of 2003 the constitutionality of the 1990 Voter Initiative “has not 
been tested in Alaska’s appellate courts, probably because the Attorney General 
has declined to enforce it”). 
Quantity of 
Marijuana 
1982 Penalty 1991 Penalty
Less Than 4 Ounces 
 
Less Than 8 Ounces 
Less Than 1 Pound 
1 Pound or More  
No penalty if possession 
is non-public49 
Class B Misdemeanor50 
Class A Misdemeanor51 
Class C Felony52 
Class B Misdemeanor53 
 
Class B Misdemeanor54 
Class A Misdemeanor55 
Class C Felony56 
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1998.59 That year, voters approved an initiative that made Alaska one of 
the first states to decriminalize marijuana for medical use.60 The 1998 
Initiative (and subsequent legislative revisions) established strict 
procedures for Alaskans to use marijuana for medical purposes.61 The 
Alaska Medical Marijuana Law is distinct from the personal use law 
established by Ravin.62 Use of medical marijuana is conditioned upon a 
physician’s certification that the patient suffers from a “debilitating 
medical condition”63 and that the patient might benefit from the medical 
use of marijuana.64 The patient must also register with the state, which 
will issue an identification card and maintain a registry of all authorized 
users.65 Registered patients may then possess up to one ounce of 
marijuana and six plants (of which only three can be flowering and 
 
 59.  See Initiatives Appearing on the Ballot in Alaska, STATE OF ALASKA DIV. OF 
ELECTIONS, 1 (2012), http://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/forms/H26.pdf (last 
revised May 2, 2012) (under the Initiative No. 97PSDM). 
 60.  See id. (The final vote tally was 131,586 (58.67%) in favor of 
decriminalization to 92,701 (41.33%) opposed). California voters passed a 
medical marijuana law in 1996; Oregon and Washington voters also approved 
medical marijuana ballot initiatives in 1998. See Michael Berkey, Mary Jane’s New 
Dance: The Medical Marijuana Legal Tango, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 
417, 428–30 (2011) (“Passing with 56% of the vote, Proposition 215 made 
California the first state to legalize medical marijuana . . . . In 1998, the 
Oregonians for Medical Rights-sponsored ‘Measure 67’ ballot passed, making 
Oregon the first state to incorporate a registration identification card system for 
medical marijuana users. Washington and Alaska voter initiatives also passed in 
1998.”). 
 61.  See ALASKA STAT. §§ 17.37.010–17.37.080 (2012) (codifying the “Medical 
Uses of Marijuana for Persons Suffering from Debilitating Medical Conditions 
Act.” These statutes included a process for joining the registry of patients 
entitled to receive a registry identification card, affirmative defenses to a 
criminal prosecution, and restrictions on medical use of marijuana.). 
 62.  See Rollins v. Ulmer, 15 P.3d 749, 750 (Alaska 2001) (“Ravin is inapposite 
to the case at hand.”); ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.030(d) (“A person, including a 
patient, primary caregiver, or alternate caregiver, is not entitled to the protection 
of this chapter for the person’s acquisition, possession, cultivation, use, sale, 
distribution, or transportation of marijuana for nonmedical use.”). Individuals 
are not required to choose one type of use or the other. There are those who use 
marijuana for medicinal purposes at home but who are not registered patients 
with the state.  See, e.g., State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 370–71 (Alaska 
2009) (“Jane Doe declares that she uses marijuana for medicinal purposes, 
though she did not register as a medical marijuana user.”). 
 63.  See ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.070(a)–(c) (broadly defining “debilitating 
medical condition” as including “cancer, glaucoma, positive status for 
immunodeficiency virus, or acquired immune deficiency syndrome” or any 
other chronic diseases, or treatment for such diseases, which produce “cachexia; 
severe pain; severe nausea; seizures, including those that are characteristic of 
epilepsy; or persistent muscle spasms, including those that are characteristic of 
multiple sclerosis.”). 
 64.  § 17.37.010(c). 
 65.  § 17.37.010. 
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producing usable marijuana at any time).66 They may not smoke 
marijuana in public, but may possess it in public under certain 
conditions: the marijuana must be in a sealed container, the marijuana 
must be concealed, and the individual must be transporting it to a 
location where it is permissible to use it.67 A medical marijuana patient 
may also designate a “primary caregiver” and an “alternative 
caregiver.”68 The caregiver designation means patients with debilitating 
illnesses do not have to be responsible for cultivating their own 
marijuana.69 The medical marijuana law does not authorize patients or 
caregivers to buy or sell marijuana.70 Registered medical marijuana 
patients and their caregivers have an affirmative defense to prosecution 
for certain marijuana-related crimes.71 
C. 2000–2005: Noy and Crocker Breathe New Life Into Ravin 
The constitutional issue raised by the passage of the 1990 Initiative 
was not addressed by an appellate court until 2003.72 In Noy v. State,73 
 
 66.  § 17.37.040(a)(4)(A)–(B). 
 67.  § 17.37.040(a)(2)(A)–(C). 
 68.  § 17.37.010(a). 
 69.  See § 17.37.040(a)(3) (“a patient may deliver marijuana to the patient’s 
primary caregiver and a primary caregiver may deliver marijuana to the patient 
for whom the caregiver is listed”). Neither the Act nor the Alaska 
Administrative Code specifically defines the duties of a primary or alternative 
caregiver. See §§ 17.37.010–17.37.080 (omitting a definition of a primary or 
alternative caregiver). But the Act does explain that if the medicinal marijuana 
patient is a minor, the minor’s parent or guardian must serve as the primary 
caregiver and “control the acquisition, possession, dosage, and frequency of use 
of marijuana by the patient.” § 17.37.010(c)(3). It follows that the caregiver for an 
adult patient would serve in a similar role. 
 70.  Alaska law only permits the primary caregiver to “deliver” marijuana to 
his or her patient, and vice versa. § 17.37.040(a)(3). “Deliver” means the “actual, 
constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled 
substance whether or not there is an agency relationship.” § 11.71.900(6). 
Conversely, such a noncommercial transfer is not permissible under Ravin. See 
Wright v. State, 651 P.2d 846, 849 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (“We conclude that 
non-commercial transfers of small quantities of marijuana must be deemed to 
fall within the ambit of the prohibition against distribution which is contained in 
AS 17.12.010.”). 
 71.  § 17.37.030(a). 
 72.  Prior to Noy, two superior court cases addressed the conflict between 
Ravin and the 1990 Initiative. In Alaskans for Privacy v. State of Alaska, filed shortly 
after the new law went into effect, plaintiffs sought summary judgment on the 
grounds that the Initiative was invalid because it sought to impermissibly 
overturn a Supreme Court decision by popular vote. Complaint for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief at 4, Alaskans for Privacy v. State, No. 3AN-91-1746 (D. 
Alaska March 4, 1991); see also Winters, supra note 3, at 326–27 (“The passage of 
the Initiative created an interesting constitutional issue—whether such an 
initiative actually had the legal power to ‘overrule’ Ravin . . . . In contrast the 
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the Alaska Court of Appeals restricted the enforcement of the statutes 
amended by the 1990 Initiative and held that “Alaska citizens have the 
right to possess less than four ounces of marijuana in their homes for 
personal use.”74 
The case began when North Pole, Alaska police officers smelled 
growing marijuana at David S. Noy’s home. The police searched Noy’s 
home and seized approximately 11 ounces of harvested marijuana and 
five immature marijuana plants.75 They did not discover any scales, 
packaging materials, nor any other evidence of commercial marijuana 
activity.76 Noy was charged with possession of more than eight ounces 
of marijuana, a violation of then-AS 11.71.050(a).77 At trial, the State did 
not offer the actual marijuana into evidence, relying instead on witness 
testimony and photographs.78 Absent that physical evidence, the jury 
could not determine the exact amount of marijuana Noy possessed and 
acquitted him of the charge of possessing more than eight ounces of 
marijuana.79 But it was clear that Noy possessed some amount of 
marijuana, so the jury found him guilty of violating AS 11.71.060(a), 
which prohibited possession of up to eight ounces of marijuana.80  Noy 
appealed, “arguing that he was convicted for engaging in conduct ([i.e.,] 
possession of marijuana for personal use in one’s home) that is protected 
 
Initiative merely altered the general Alaska Criminal Code, not the Alaska 
Constitution itself.”). The lawsuit was dropped before a final decision on the 
merits because Alaskans for Privacy did not have the funding to continue the 
litigation through a hearing. Id. at 328. In State v. McNeil, discussed infra, the 
defendant was arrested for conduct that was permitted under Ravin but banned 
by the Initiative. Memorandum of Decision, State of Alaska v. McNeil, No. 1KE-
93-947CR 1–2  (D. Alaska October 29, 1993). The Superior Court dismissed the 
charges and ruled that Ravin remained the controlling law on the issue of 
personal marijuana possession in the home. See id. at 6 (“Accordingly, with no 
basis to overrule or even qualify the Ravin decision, it must be applied.”). The 
reasoning espoused by Alaskans for Privacy and employed by the judge in 
McNeil was also referenced by the Alaska Court of Appeals in Walker v. State. See 
991 P.2d 799, 803 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (“To resolve Walker’s case, we need 
only hold—and we do hold—that eight ounces or more of marijuana is an 
amount large enough to fall within the Ravin court’s category of ‘indicative of 
intent to sell.’”). Both the majority and concurring opinions noted that the 
constitutionality of the statute amended by the Initiative was “questionable” 
because of its conflict with Ravin. Id. at 801, 804. 
 73.  83 P.3d 538 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003). 
 74.  Id. at 540. 
 75.  Id. The plants were not tested for THC and did not form part of the 
state’s case. Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  See id. at 540. 
 80.  See id. at 543. 
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by the privacy provision of the Alaska Constitution.”81 
The discrete question presented to the Court of Appeals was 
whether AS 11.71.060(a), the statute under which Noy was convicted, 
was constitutional to the extent that it prohibited possession of 
marijuana by adults in their homes for personal use.82 “To make the 
statute conform to the constitution again,” the court returned it to its 
pre-1990 interpretation, which included a “presumptively 
constitutional” four-ounce limit on marijuana possession in the home by 
adults for personal use.83 In the court’s words, “with respect to 
possession of marijuana by adults in their home for personal use 
(conduct that is protected under the Ravin decision), AS 11.71.060(a)(1) 
remains constitutional to the extent that it prohibits possession of four 
ounces or more of marijuana. Restricted in this fashion, AS 
11.71.060(a)(1) remains enforceable.”84 
The State requested rehearing before the Court of Appeals but was 
denied.85 The State then petitioned the Alaska Supreme Court to exercise 
its discretionary review of court of appeals cases.86 In its petition for 
hearing, the State added an argument that Ravin should be overturned 
because new studies demonstrated that marijuana was now more 
dangerous than suggested by the scientific evidence presented in 
 
 81.  Id at 540. 
 82.  Id. at 542. 
 83.  Id. at 543. 
 84.  Id. For Noy, this meant that his conviction would be overturned. The 
jury was never asked to determine the precise amount of marijuana Noy 
possessed; it only found that it was some amount under eight ounces. Id. It was 
possible that the jury could have believed that Noy possessed less than four 
ounces, which would have fallen within the scope of what was protected under 
Ravin. Id. The court therefore reversed the conviction, but would allow Noy to be 
retried if the State believed he possessed at least four but less than eight ounces 
of marijuana. Id. at 540, 543–44. 
 85.  Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 545, 549 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) [hereinafter Noy II]. 
In its petition, the State identified “some half-dozen” ways in which the court 
erred. Id. at 546. The court summarily dismissed the State’s argument that Ravin 
only created an affirmative defense for individuals who were prosecuted for 
possessing marijuana. Id. at 548. The court explained that in the nearly thirty 
years since Ravin had been decided, there had been absolutely no suggestion 
that Ravin was anything other “than normal constitutional litigation” in which 
the Supreme Court restricted the state’s power to legislate in a particular area. 
Id. at 547. The court of appeals rejected this exact same argument a few years 
later. See State v. Crocker, 97 P.3d 93, 95 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (“We addressed 
and rejected this same argument in our opinion on rehearing in Noy . . . .”). The 
court also was not swayed by the State’s belief that the Noy decision would 
unfairly block the State’s ability to show the need to overturn Ravin or to 
prohibit marijuana possession in the future, stating, “The State remains free in 
the future to challenge the continuing vitality of Ravin.” Id. at 549. 
 86.  Petition For Hearing at 15, State v. Noy, Supreme Court No. S-11297 
(Jan. 5, 2004). 
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Ravin.87 Despite this new evidence, the court declined to hear the case.88 
That left Noy, and the Legislature’s four-ounce dividing line from 1982, 
in place as the controlling law of the state. 
Noy remains one of the most significant post-Ravin appellate 
rulings to date. Noy made it very clear that conduct protected by a 
constitutional right could not be criminalized by statute.89 Neither the 
legislature nor the voters could overturn a judicial interpretation of the 
constitutional right to privacy.90 
By clarifying the legal status of marijuana in Alaska, Noy also 
created a unique scenario for law enforcement officials seeking to 
establish probable cause to search a residence for evidence of a 
marijuana-related crime.91 Unlike most other contraband or illegal 
narcotics, marijuana (whether burning, growing, or harvested) carries a 
distinct odor.92 Thus, one could establish the presence of marijuana in a 
residence by smell alone.93 In other jurisdictions where all marijuana use 
and possession is illegal, the odor of marijuana alone is sufficient 
probable cause for a search warrant.94 But in Alaska, where personal 
 
 87.  Id. at 4–11. 
 88.  Order, State v. Noy, Supreme Court No. S-11297 (Sept. 7, 2004). 
 89.  Noy II, 83 P.3d at 542. 
 90.  Id. 
 91. See Van Buren v. State, 823 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) 
(quoting Badoino v. State, 785 P.2d 39, 41 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990)) (“Probable 
cause to issue a search warrant exists when ‘reliable information is set forth in 
sufficient detail to warrant a reasonably prudent [person] in believing that a 
crime has been or was being committed.’”) (alteration in original). 
 92.  See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111 (1965) (“A qualified 
officer’s detection of the smell of hash has often been held a very strong factor in 
determining that probable cause exists so as to allow issuance of a warrant.”); 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 12–13 (1948) (observing that “a strong odor 
of burning opium which . . . was distinctive and unmistakable” was sufficient 
evidence for probable cause); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932) (noting 
that the mere odor of illegal whiskey can provide probable cause sufficient for a 
warrant to search private property); cf. United States v. Tate, 694 F.2d 1217, 1221 
(9th Cir. 1982) (finding that because ether has legitimate uses, its odor, absent 
additional evidence, does not establish probable cause to issue a search warrant). 
 93.  Many cases show that police officers “find it easy” to detect the presence 
of marijuana by smelling burned or burning marijuana, unburned marijuana, 
and the odor of marijuana on clothing. See Susan F. Mandiberg, Marijuana 
Prohibition and the Shrinking of the Fourth Amendment, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 23, 
39–42 (2012) (noting many instances where police officers used plain smell to 
identify marijuana). 
 94.  See United States v. Kerr, 876 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he 
presence of the odor of contraband may itself be sufficient to establish probable 
cause.”); see also United States v. Ramos, 443 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2006) (“It is 
well settled that the smell of marijuana alone, if articulable and particularized, 
may establish not merely reasonable suspicion, but probable cause.”); United 
States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 659 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[I]f an officer smells the 
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marijuana possession in the home is permitted under state law, the odor 
of marijuana emanating from a residence would establish only the 
presence of some unspecified amount of marijuana. It would not 
automatically establish the existence of an illegal amount of marijuana. 
 In State v. Crocker95 the Alaska Court of Appeals addressed this key 
practical aspect of implementing the right to privacy and revised the 
probable cause standard that must be met before a search warrant could 
be issued to search a home for evidence of marijuana-related activity.96 
The court held that “a judicial officer should not issue a warrant to 
search a person’s home for evidence of marijuana possession unless the 
State’s warrant application establishes probable cause to believe that the 
person’s possession of marijuana exceeds the scope of the possession 
that is constitutionally protected under Ravin.”97 In other words, there 
must be “good reason to believe that the law has been broken (and that 
evidence of that illegality can be found on the premises to be 
searched).”98 
The search warrant issued in Crocker did not meet this standard. 
The warrant application contained an assertion that the arresting officers 
perceived “a strong odor of growing marijuana” when they stood at the 
front door of the residence to be searched.99 But the warrant application 
did not indicate that the strength of the marijuana odor gave the officers 
any indication as to the amount of marijuana that might be growing 
inside the home.100 Lacking that connection between odor and amount, 
the court of appeals ruled that the officers could not establish probable 
cause to believe that anyone inside the house was breaking the law.101 
 
odor of marijuana in circumstances where the officer can localize its source to a 
person, the officer has probable cause . . . .”); United States v. Pierre, 958 F.2d 
1304, 1310 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“The smell of burned contraband [created] 
probable cause to search the vehicle for suspected contraband.”). 
 95.  97 P.3d 93 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). 
 96.  Id. at 94. Prior to Noy, the Alaska Court of Appeals held that an officer 
who smelled growing marijuana from a defendant’s home had probable cause to 
obtain a search warrant. Lustig v. State, 36 P.3d 731, 733 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001). 
 97.  Crocker, 97 P.3d at 94; see also Starkey v. State, 272 P.3d 347, 353 n.8 
(Alaska Ct. App. 2012) (forbidding search warrants in the absence of probable 
cause that the type of marijuana possession at issue is something other than the 
type of possession protected by Ravin). 
 98.  Crocker, 97 P.3d at 96. 
 99.  Id. at 97. The search warrant application in Crocker also included 
evidence of “higher than average” electricity usage. Id. at 98. The court did not 
consider this persuasive evidence of a commercial marijuana grow. Id. 
Furthermore, the court had previously ruled that “utility records showing 
unusual electrical consumption have no inherent incriminatory value.” Carter v. 
State, 910 P.2d 619, 625 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). 
 100.  Crocker, 97 P.3d at 97. 
 101.  Id. at 96–97. Judge Coats authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that this 
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Simply smelling the odor of marijuana from outside a residence was not 
persuasive evidence that the amount of marijuana being grown inside 
exceeded four ounces or was possessed for commercial purposes.102 
Following the court of appeals ruling, the State petitioned the 
Alaska Supreme Court for review.103 The court again declined to hear a 
case implicating Ravin.104 
During this time period the Alaska courts formally reaffirmed the 
vitality of Ravin and the right to privacy over the statutory changes 
made in 1990.105 However, Alaska voters were not interested in further 
decriminalization efforts as they rejected ballot initiatives that included 
broad marijuana decriminalization plans in both 2000 and 2004.106 
 
holding was a departure from prior cases where the court of appeals found that 
an officer who smelled growing marijuana from a defendant’s home had 
probable cause to obtain a search warrant. Id. at 99 (Coats, J., dissenting) (citing 
Lustig v. State, 36 P.3d 731 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001); Wallace v. State, 933 P.2d 
1157 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997); McClelland v. State, 928 P.2d 1224 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1996); Landers v. State, 809 P.2d 424 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991)). The majority 
distinguished these cases on the grounds that they were issued before the court’s 
ruling in Noy and did not directly implicate Ravin. Id. at 96. 
 102.  See id. at 96 (noting that the probable cause standard requires an officer 
to suspect the amount, not merely the presence of marijuana). Courts in other 
jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions following marijuana 
decriminalization. See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 910 (Mass. 2011) 
(finding that after criminal marijuana statute was amended to make possession 
of one ounce or less a civil offense, smell alone no longer constituted probable 
cause that a criminal offense had occurred). 
 103.  Petition For Hearing at 8, State v. Crocker, Supreme Court No. S-11651 
(Dec. 30, 2004). 
 104.  Order, State v. Crocker, Supreme Court No. S-11651 (Dec. 30, 2004). 
   105.  See Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538, 543 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (restricting 
section 11.71.060(a)(1) of the Alaska Statutes from applying to amounts of 
marijuana less than four ounces inside the home for personal use); see also 
Crocker, 97 P.3d at 97 (holding that law enforcement officers cannot presume the 
presence of a prohibited amount of marijuana inside the home by smell alone). 
 106.  See 2000 General Election Ballot Measures, STATE OF ALASKA DIVISION OF 
ELECTIONS, http://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/oep/2000/bm00.htm#99he 
mpsum (last visited Oct. 5, 2012) (outlining pros and cons of ballot measure to 
re-legalize hemp); Alaska Marijuana Decriminalization Initiative, Measure 5 (2000), 
BALLOTPEDIA,  http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Alaska_Marijuana_ 
Decriminalization_Initiative,_Measure_5_(2000) (last updated Apr. 20, 2012) 
(explaining details of initiative to re-legalize hemp); Alaska Legalize Marijuana 
Act, Measure 2 (2004), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php 
/Alaska_Legalize_Marijuana_Act,_Measure_2_(2004) (last updated Apr. 20, 
2012) (providing overview of the Legalize Marijuana Act); Ballot Measure 2 – 
Initiative to Legalize Marijuana, 2004 STATE OF ALASKA OFFICIAL ELECTION 
PAMPHLET 90–91, available at http://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/oep 
/2004/2004_oep_reg_1.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2012) (reprinting statements in 
support and opposition of ballot measure to legalize marijuana). 
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D. 2006–2009: The Effort to Overturn Ravin 
In 2006 the Alaska Legislature passed House Bill 149, which 
amended the state’s criminal marijuana statutes so as to prohibit all 
marijuana use and possession in Alaska, even by adults in the privacy of 
the home.107 This legislation began as two proposed bills presented by 
Governor Frank Murkowski during the previous legislative session.108 
The impetus behind the Governor’s recriminalization push was that 
marijuana had become very potent and dangerous and the Alaska 
Supreme Court had shown an “unwillingness to reconsider the latest 
scientific evidence on the harmful effects of marijuana.”109 It was 
 
 107.  See H.B. 149, 24th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2006); Act effective June 3, 2006, 
§§ 7–10, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 53 (detailing language of H.B. 149). 
 108.  In January 2005 Governor Frank Murkowski introduced Senate Bill 74 
and House Bill 96 to the 24th Alaska Legislature. S.B. 74, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. 
(Alaska 2005); ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. 0112–15 (Jan. 21, 2005) 
(reprinting Governor Murkowski’s transmittal letter); H.B. 96, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. 
(Alaska 2005) (text of House Bill); ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. 0126–
30 (Jan. 21, 2005) (reprinting Governor Murkowski’s transmittal letter). Neither 
bill garnered enough support to pass that session. See Sean Cockerham, Pot Bill 
Is Out of Time, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 8, 2005, at A1 (detailing the 
expected failure of the bill). The following year the Senate added Governor 
Murkowski’s marijuana provisions to House Bill 149, a bill concerning 
methamphetamine already approved by the House of Representatives. See 
ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. 1029–30 (Apr. 13, 2005) (outlining in 
transmittal letter Governor’s proposed revisions); ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 
2d Sess. 2792–94 (Apr. 18, 2006) (adopting H.B. 149). The House, however, 
refused to accept the changes and voted down the Senate’s version of the Bill. 
ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 2d Sess. 3212–13 (Apr. 19, 2006) (voting not to 
adopt H.B. 149). Governor Murkowski was frustrated by the House’s decision, 
and some speculated that he levied intense political pressure on House members 
to reconsider their vote. See Matt Volz, House Passes Merged Drug Bill - 
REVERSAL: Measure Restricts Access to Meth Ingredients, Makes Possession of 
Marijuana Illegal, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 6, 2006, at A1 (“House Minority 
Leader Ethan Berkowitz, D-Anchorage, said he believed the only reason the vote 
was reversed was because of pressure on lawmakers by the governor’s office for 
Murkowski’s priority bill.”). In an unusual move, the House did indeed rescind 
its previous vote, then re-voted and approved the marijuana amendments as an 
add-on to the methamphetamine legislation. ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 2d 
Sess. 3696–98 (May 5, 2006) (voting to rescind previous action). See H.B. 149, 24th 
Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2006) (adding marijuana provisions to methamphetamine 
language). The final version of the bill, Conference Committee Substitute for 
H.B. 149, was signed into law by the Governor as Alaska Session Law chapter 
53, and went into effect the next day. ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 2d Sess. 
4152 (June 6, 2006) (reprinting message that bill was signed into law); Act 
effective June 3, 2006, §§ 7–10, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 53 (session law 
language of new bill). 
 109.  ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. 0112–13 (Jan. 21, 2005); ALASKA 
H. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. 0127–28; see Order, State v. Noy, Supreme Court 
No. S-11297 (Sept. 7, 2004) (denying request to reconsider the reasoning in 
Ravin). 
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therefore incumbent upon the Legislature to “take a stand” to protect 
the health and safety of Alaskans.110 
The final bill lowered the thresholds for each marijuana offense, 
thereby increasing the criminal penalties for possession of smaller 
quantities of marijuana.111 From 1990 to 2006, sections 11.71.060(a)(1) 
and (a)(2) of the Alaska Statutes established two overlapping crimes: 
possession of any amount of marijuana and possession of less than eight 
ounces of marijuana were each class B misdemeanors. House Bill 149 
changed the law by making possession of less than one ounce a class B 
misdemeanor,112 possession of one to four ounces a class A 
misdemeanor,113 and possession of four or more ounces a class C 
felony.114 And similar to the statutory changes mandated by the 1990 
ballot initiative, there was no exception for personal use or possession in 
the home.115 Thus, given the court of appeals’ prior ruling in Noy, the 
2006 amendments “effectively re-criminalized possession of small 
amounts of marijuana by adults in the privacy of their homes.”116 A 
summary of the changes is contained in the following table: 
 
 
 110.  ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. 0112 (Jan. 21, 2005) (“I believe it 
is time for the Alaska Legislature to take a stand and debunk the myth that 
marijuana is a harmless recreational drug.”); accord ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 24th 
Leg., 1st Sess. 0127 (Jan. 21, 2005) (“I believe it is time for the Alaska Legislature 
to take a stand and debunk the myth that marijuana is a harmless recreational 
drug.”). 
 111.  See Act effective June 3, 2006, §§ 7–9, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 53 
(criminalizing all possession of marijuana). The bill also changed the method for 
determining the weight of marijuana contained in growing plants: “For 
purposes of calculating the aggregate weight of a live marijuana plant, the 
aggregate weight shall be one-sixth of the measured weight of the marijuana 
plant after the roots of the marijuana plant have been removed.” Id. § 10 
(amending section 11.71.080 of the Alaska Statutes). 
 112.  ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060(a)(2) (2012) (possessing less than one ounce of 
marijuana is a class B misdemeanor). 
 113.  § 11.71.050(a)(2)(E). 
 114.  § 11.71.040(a)(3)(F) (possessing four ounces or more of marijuana is a 
class C felony). 
 115.  House Bill 149 did make one concession for personal use in the home. 
The bill amended the state sentencing guidelines for misdemeanor marijuana 
possession. Act effective June 3, 2006, § 16, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 53. Under 
the amended section 12.55.135(j) of the Alaska Statutes, a person convicted of 
possession of less than one ounce of marijuana in the home for personal use only 
faces incarceration if compounding conditions are met, such as if the person had 
one or more prior convictions or if the person was on parole or probation. 
Otherwise, the maximum penalty for a first offense is a $500 fine, and a $1,000 
fine for a second offense. See State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 370 n.32 
(Alaska 2009). 
 116.  Zoha Barkeshli, Right of Privacy—Citizens’ Right to Fly High Not Yet Ripe 
for Review According to Alaska Supreme Court, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 993, 999 (2010). 
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Statutory Criminal Penalties for Simple Marijuana Possession in 
Alaska (1991 and 2006)117 
 
The 2006 amendments left the state marijuana laws identical in 
effect to the laws ruled unconstitutional in both Ravin and Noy.128 This 
 
 117.  This table is not inclusive of all marijuana-related crimes or any 
applicable affirmative defenses; it lists only penalties applicable to simple 
possession under state law. 
 118. ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060(a)(1), (b) (1992) (outlining penalties for less than 
eight ounces) (current version ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060 (2012)). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. § 11.71.050(a)(3)(E), (b) (1992) (current version ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.050 
(2012))  (outlining penalties for eight ounces or more). 
 122. § 11.71.040(a)(3)(F), (b) (1992) (current version ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060 
(2012)) (outlining penalties for one pound or more). 
 123. § 11.71.060(a)(2), (b) (2012) (outlining penalties for less than one ounce). 
A class B misdemeanor is punishable by up to 90 days in prison and a $2,000 
fine. § 12.55.135(b) (listing 90 day law); § 12.55.035(b)(6) (listing $2,000 fine). 
Possession of any amount of marijuana remained a default Class B 
misdemeanor. § 11.71.060(a)(1) (listing penalty for someone who “uses or 
displays any amount of a schedule VIA controlled substance”). 
 124. § 11.71.050(a)(2)(E), (b) (listing penalty for one ounce or more). A Class A 
misdemeanor is punishable by up to one year in prison and a $10,000 fine. § 
12.55.135(a); § 12.55.035(b)(5). There is no statute that specifically addresses 
possession of between one and four ounces of marijuana, but the new section 
11.71.040(a)(3)(F) of the Alaska Statutes (amended by Act effective June 3, 2006, § 
7, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 53) made possession of four ounces or more a Class 
C felony, effectively making section 11.71.050(a)(2)(E) of the Alaska Statutes 
applicable only to possession of amounts more than one ounce but less than 
four. § 11.71.040(a)(2)(E) (2012). 
 125. § 11.71.040(a)(3)(F), (d) (201 2) (listing penalty for four ounces or more). A 
class C felony is punishable by a prison sentence of up to five years and a 
$50,000 fine. § 12.55.125(e); § 12.55.035(b)(3). 
 126. § 11.71.040(a)(3)(F), (d) (listing penalty for four ounces or more). 
 127. Id. 
 128. See § 11.71.050; § 11.71.060 (possessing any amount of a schedule VIA 
controlled substance is at least a Class B misdemeanor). 
Quantity of 
Marijuana 
1991 Penalty 2006 Penalty
Less than 1 Ounce 
1 to 4 Ounces 
4 to 8 Ounces 
8 Ounces to 1 Pound 
1 Pound or More 
Class B Misdemeanor118
Class B Misdemeanor119 
Class B Misdemeanor 120 
Class A Misdemeanor121 
Class C Felony122 
Class B Misdemeanor123 
Class A Misdemeanor124 
Class C Felony125 
Class C Felony126 
Class C Felony127 
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was the first time since Ravin was issued that the Alaska Legislature 
passed laws that directly conflicted with Ravin. The Legislature was 
aware of this conflict, and acknowledged that a court challenge would 
probably follow. The final bill included a series of findings on the health 
and social effects of marijuana in order “[t]o assist the courts in 
considering these issues.”129 The findings alleged that marijuana usage 
rates were higher and modern marijuana was much more potent than 
the marijuana commonly used in 1975 when Ravin was decided.130 
According to the bill, this increase in potency and usage led directly to 
significant negative health and social consequences.131 
A thorough critique of the scientific validity of the Legislature’s 
findings is beyond the scope of this article.132 However, it should be 
noted that the public hearings133 on this legislation called the accuracy 
 
 129. Act effective June 3, 2006, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 53. 
 130. For the complete legislative findings contained in House Bill 149, see Act 
effective June 3, 2006, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 53. The Alaska Supreme 
Court summarized the findings: “(1) Marijuana potency has increased 
dramatically in the last 30 years, particularly in Alaska, and corresponds to an 
increase in rehabilitative and hospital treatment related to marijuana use. (2) 
Hundreds of Alaskans are treated for marijuana abuse each year, more than half 
being children; pregnant women in Alaska use marijuana at a higher rate than 
the national average. (3) Many users become psychologically dependent on 
marijuana under recognized clinical standards. (4) Early exposure to marijuana 
increases the likelihood of health and social problems, including mental health 
problems. (5) Many people treated for alcoholism also abuse marijuana, and 
alcoholism treatment is more difficult when marijuana is used. (6) Marijuana 
affects many body and brain functions; it often contains bacteria and fungi 
harmful to humans. (7) A higher percentage of adults and juveniles arrested in 
Alaska have marijuana in their systems at the time of arrest. (8) If a parent uses 
marijuana, then their children are much more likely to become marijuana users; 
studies have shown that criminal penalties increase the perception among 
teenagers of the risks of using marijuana, thus reducing use.” State v. ACLU of 
Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 367 (Alaska 2009). 
 131. See Act effective June 3, 2006, § 2, 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 53 
(outlining negative health findings for §§ 7–10). 
 132. For a review of scientific literature detailing recent findings on 
marijuana, see generally Itai Danovitch, Sorting Through the Science on Marijuana: 
Facts, Fallacies, and Implications for Legalization, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 91 (2012). 
 133. In March, April, and May 2005, the Alaska Senate and House of 
Representatives held a number of public hearings and received documentary 
and testimonial evidence from proponents and opponents of marijuana 
decriminalization. See S.B. 74, ALASKA S. HEALTH, EDUC. & SOCIAL SERVS. COMM. 
MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Mar. 21, 2005, Mar. 23, 2005, Apr. 1, 2005) (detailing 
proceedings from hearings on Senate Bill 74); S.B. 74, ALASKA S. JUDIC. COMM. 
MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Apr. 11, 2005, Apr. 20, 2005, Apr. 23, 2005, May 3, 2005 (no 
public testimony), May 5, 2005) (detailing proceedings from hearings on Senate 
Bill 74); H.B. 96, ALASKA H. JUDIC. COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Apr. 8, 2005, Apr. 
12, 2005) (detailing proceedings from hearings on House Bill 96). Additional 
hearings were held in early 2006. See S.B. 74, ALASKA S. FINANCE COMM. MINUTES, 
24th Leg. (Jan. 10, 2006, Jan. 12, 2006) (listing proceedings from hearings on 
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and objectiveness of the legislature’s findings into question.134 The 
findings appeared to be predetermined—they were nearly identical to 
the proposed findings the Governor submitted prior to any testimony 
being heard and consisted of largely the same evidence the state had 
previously submitted to the Alaska Supreme Court in support of its 
petitions for hearing in Noy.135 And for each point raised by the 
Legislature, or proposed by the witnesses who testified in support of the 
legislation, scientific experts presented testimony containing opposing 
evidence.136 
 
Senate Bill 74). 
 134. Some senators were very critical of the findings. Senator Hollis French 
proposed removing the findings from the bill. The Senator explained that many 
experts refuted the findings, “which weren’t proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
‘Science should be in the laboratory and not in the . . . statute.’” H.B. 149, ALASKA 
S. CONF. COMM. 24th Leg. (Apr. 12, 2006) (statement of Senator Hollis French at 
6:37:54 PM) (alteration in original). The Senator was also concerned that the 
House had not had the opportunity to fully analyze and debate the marijuana 
issues addressed in the bill. Id. at 6:41:10 PM (expressing concern that not 
enough research had been done). 
 135. Compare S.B. 74 § 2, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2005), and H.B. 96 § 2, 
24th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2005), with Petition For Hearing at 6, State v. Noy, 
Supreme Court No. S-11297 (Jan. 5, 2004). 
 136. See S.B. 74 – Crimes Involving Marijuana/Other Drugs, ALASKA S. HEALTH, 
EDUC. & SOCIAL SERVS. COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Apr. 1, 2005) (statement of Dr. 
Lester Grinspoon, M.D., Associate Professor of Psychiatry at the Harvard 
Medical School at 2:21:19 PM) (“[M]arijuana is no more harmful today than it 
was in 1975 when I testified in the Ravin Court.”); S.B. 74 – Crimes Involving 
Marijuana/Other Drugs, ALASKA S. JUDIC. COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Apr. 11, 
2005) (statement of Dr. Grinspoon at 10:06:04 AM, 10:08:17 AM) (“Most of what 
people are led to believe about the dangers of marijuana is mythical. . . . Street 
marijuana is more potent but does not impose increased risk. A user simply uses 
less.”); S.B. 74 – Crimes Involving Marijuana/Other Drugs, ALASKA S. HEALTH, 
EDUC. & SOCIAL SERVS. COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Apr. 1, 2005) (statement of Dr. 
Mitch Earleywine, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Psychology, University of 
Southern California at 2:40:31 PM) (“[T]his substance is not completely harmless, 
but certainly nowhere as dangerous as the way it’s been depicted by some of the 
physicians that have testified on this bill.”); S.B. 74 – Crimes Involving 
Marijuana/Other Drugs, ALASKA S. JUDIC. COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Apr. 11, 
2005) (statement of Dr. Earleywine at 10:43:50 AM) (“Previous testimony 
regarding higher levels of marijuana potency has been exaggerated.”); ALASKA S. 
FINANCE COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Jan. 12, 2006); H.B. 96, ALASKA H. JUDIC. 
COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Apr. 12, 2005); S.B. 74, ALASKA S. FINANCE COMM. 
MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Jan. 12, 2006); S.B. 74 – Crimes Involving Marijuana/Other 
Drugs, ALASKA S. HEALTH, EDUC. & SOCIAL SERVS. COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. 
(Apr. 1, 2005) (statement of Dr. Kelly Drew, Associate Professor of Chemistry 
and Biochemistry at University of Alaska Fairbanks at 2:51:06 PM) (“[T]he 
bottom line of the evidence does not support the assertion that marijuana poses 
a threat to public health that justifies prohibiting its use and possession in the 
state.”); S.B. 74, ALASKA S. FINANCE COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Jan. 10, 2006); S.B. 
74 – Crimes Involving Marijuana/Other Drugs, ALASKA S. HEALTH, EDUC. & SOCIAL 
SERVS. COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Apr. 1, 2005) (statement of Dr. Less Iverson, 
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Shortly after House Bill 149 was signed into law, a lawsuit was filed 
that challenged the constitutionality of the blanket marijuana 
prohibition imposed by the 2006 amendments.137 In ACLU of Alaska v. 
State,138 the plaintiffs argued that by outlawing possession of all 
marijuana, including possession of small amounts in the home for 
personal use by adults, the new laws violated the privacy clause of the 
Alaska Constitution as interpreted by Ravin.139 Superior Court Judge 
Patricia Collins agreed, declaring the challenged legislation 
unconstitutional to the extent it conflicted with Ravin and 
“criminalize[d] possession of small amounts of marijuana in the home 
by consenting adults for purely personal, non-commercial use.”140 Judge 
Collins ruled that stare decisis commanded that Ravin remained the law 
“[u]nless and until the supreme court directs otherwise.”141 The judge 
did not address the thousands of pages of scientific journals, books, 
testimony, and other evidence the parties submitted, nor did she reach 
the issue of whether the State’s “new, although disputed, data justifies 
revisiting Ravin.”142 That decision was “uniquely within the province of 
the Alaska Supreme Court.”143 The State appealed to the Alaska 
 
Professor of Pharmacology at the University at Oxford, England at 3:16:35 PM) 
(“[T]he statements in SB 74 give an inaccurate picture of the scientific data about 
marijuana . . . . In my view marijuana is a relatively safe drug and its use does 
less medical and social harm than alcohol or tobacco.”); S.B. 74 – Crimes Involving 
Marijuana/Other Drugs, ALASKA S. JUDIC. COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Apr. 11, 
2005) (statement of Dr. Tim Hinterberger, Ph.D., Associate Professor of 
Biomedicine, University of Alaska Anchorage at 10:38:45 AM) (“SB 74 disregards 
existing scientific consensus of the health, social, and economic effects of our 
current marijuana policy.”); S.B. 74 – Crimes Involving Marijuana/Other Drugs, 
ALASKA S. JUDIC. COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (May 5, 2005) (statement of Dr. 
Hinterberger at 8:58:55 AM, 9:02:41 AM) (“Marijuana is a relatively benign 
drug.”); S.B. 74 – Crimes Involving Marijuana/Other Drugs, ALASKA S. JUDIC. 
COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg. (Apr. 11, 2005) (statement of Dr. Robert Malamede, 
Ph.D., Professor of Biology, University of Colorado at Colorado Springs at 
10:33:33 AM) (“[M]arijuana has a tremendous amount of positive uses.”). 
 137. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, ACLU of Alaska v. 
State, No. IJU-06-793CI (Alaska Super. Ct. June 5, 2006), 2006 WL 6457041. 
 138. No. IJU-06-793 CI, 2006 WL 6457870 (Alaska Super. Ct. July 10, 2006). 
 139. Id. at *2. 
 140. Id. at *1. Judge Collins’ order was limited to the constitutionality of 
section 11.71.060(a) of the Alaska Statutes as it criminalized possession of less 
than one ounce of marijuana. Id. at *3 (“This decision is limited to the narrow 
issue presented.”). The judge found that plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged 
that any plaintiff or ACLU member actually possessed more than one ounce of 
marijuana in the home. Id. at *3–4. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ challenge to section 
11.71.050(a)(2)(E) of the Alaska Statutes, which recriminalized possession of 
more than one ounce of marijuana, was not considered. Id. at *3–4. 
 141. Id. at *9, *11–12. 
 142. Id. at *11. 
 143. Id. at *11–12. 
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Supreme Court. 
On appeal, in State v. ACLU of Alaska,144 the state argued that Ravin 
should no longer control and that a blanket prohibition on personal 
marijuana use was justified.145 Relying on the Legislature’s findings, the 
state identified numerous factors that had changed since Ravin was 
decided: marijuana was much more potent and intoxicating, more 
people were using marijuana and were starting to use marijuana at 
younger ages, and the adverse consequences of marijuana use were 
better understood.146 Conversely, Plaintiffs argued that there were no 
grounds to overturn Ravin because marijuana was still a relatively 
harmless substance, as it was when Ravin was decided.147 Plaintiffs also 
argued that if the supreme court was inclined to reconsider Ravin, the 
court should remand the case for an evidentiary hearing to assess the 
nature and effects of marijuana use and not blindly defer to the 
Legislature’s findings.148 
The Alaska Supreme Court did not address any of these arguments. 
In a 3-2 opinion, the Court held that the matter was not ripe for review, 
vacated the superior court’s decision, and dismissed the case without 
reaching the merits of the constitutional issues.149 The court ruled that 
any challenge to the constitutionality of the 2006 amendments must 
“arise from an actual prosecution brought under the amended 
statute.”150 
State v. ACLU of Alaska was not decided the way any of the parties 
anticipated. The court raised the ripeness issue sua sponte a year after the 
initial briefing was completed.151 The parties were united in agreement 
that the case was ripe and “asked—indeed, implored” the court to 
 
 144. 204 P.3d 364 (Alaska 2009). 
 145. Id. at 367. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 373–74. See Barkeshli, supra note 116, at 1007 (“The question of 
whether the new amendments encroach upon Alaska citizens’ constitutional 
right to privacy remains unresolved.”). 
 150. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d at 367. Justice Matthews’ majority opinion 
explained, “[t]he relaxed approach to ripeness sometimes taken with respect to 
pre-enforcement challenges to criminal laws is not appropriate here because 
plaintiffs already face a risk of prosecution for home use of marijuana under 
federal drug statutes.” Id. In dissent, Justice Carpeneti (joined by Justice 
Winfree) disagreed with the risk of federal prosecution and was concerned that 
the decision ran counter to long-established Alaska law which reflects a “deep-
seated commitment to the idea that the doors of Alaska’s courts should be open 
to its citizens to the greatest extent possible.” Id. at 374–75 (Carpeneti, J., 
dissenting). For a more detailed discussion of the court’s opinion, see Barkeshli, 
supra note 116. 
 151. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d at 367. 
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decide on the merits, as this was “a high-profile case in which the 
general public as well as the executive and legislative branches of 
government [were] interested.”152 The intentional lack of guidance on 
the constitutionality of Ravin was particularly troubling to Justice 
Carpeneti who argued in dissent that the court should have reached the 
merits because “[t]he state needs to know whether the new statute is 
constitutional or whether, conversely, Ravin retains vitality. The 
plaintiffs need to have the same question answered, or face the difficult 
and unfair choice of foregoing possibly constitutionally protected 
activity or risking criminal penalties.”153 However, by dismissing the 
matter on procedural grounds, the majority tacitly preserved the 
continuing vitality of Ravin v. State. 
E. Post-State v. ACLU of Alaska: Ravin and Noy Still Control 
State v. ACLU of Alaska did not upset Ravin’s interpretation of the 
right of privacy, nor did it limit an adult’s ability to engage in private, 
personal marijuana possession and use in any way. It left the law just as 
it was after the 2006 marijuana prohibition amendments were passed 
and before the litigation challenging those amendments began: the 
Alaska criminal marijuana statutes on the books facially conflicted with 
a longstanding Alaska Supreme Court decision. Thus, following State v. 
ACLU of Alaska, and without any subsequent reported decisions on 
point, the legal landscape regarding marijuana in Alaska was, and 
remains, identical to how it looked to the court in Noy v. State. It follows 
that the same legal analysis employed in Noy applies with respect to the 
2006 amendments: “[w]hen a statute conflicts with a provision of [the] 
state constitution, the statute must give way . . . a statute which purports 
to attach criminal penalties to constitutionally protected conduct is 
void.”154 As was the case in Noy, Alaska’s current criminal marijuana 
statutes are unconstitutional and unenforceable to the extent they 
prohibit conduct protected by Ravin.155 
That these statutes remain “on the books” does not bear on the 
 
 152. Id. at 373–74, 381 (Carpeneti, J., dissenting). 
 153. Id. at 380 (citations omitted). 
 154. Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538, 542 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (internal citations 
omitted); see also Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1237 (Alaska 1979) (citing 
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803)) (finding legislative enactment may 
not authorize infringement of constitutional rights); Macauley v. Hildebrand, 
491 P.2d 120, 122 (Alaska 1971) (blocking enforcement of Juneau ordinance that 
conflicted with state education statute because ordinance conflicted with state 
law on matter of statewide concern). 
 155. Noy, 83 P.3d at 542. 
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protections afforded by the right to privacy. A judicial decision limiting 
the enforcement and applicability of a statute does not automatically 
wipe the statute off the books or require the legislature to revise the 
statute. In both Ravin and Noy, the courts ruled that the statutes at issue 
were unconstitutional as applied to certain conduct. Following Ravin the 
legislature amended the statutes to codify the decision, but following 
Noy the text of the Alaska Statutes remained unchanged from the 1990 
Initiative and continued to contain a blanket prohibition on marijuana 
use.156 The statutes were not revised until 2006 when they were 
amended to enhance the penalties for all marijuana use and possession. 
Despite the protections afforded by Ravin and Noy, the Alaska Statutes 
have stood as an empty prohibition against all personal use and 
possession of marijuana since 1991. 
This situation is not entirely out of the ordinary. There are many 
examples of statutes that are not in line with judicial opinions. Such 
“dead letter” statutes have remained on the books long after they were 
struck down or were recognized as unenforceable.157 The difference 
between the current Alaska marijuana laws and such dead letter statutes 
is that the Alaska laws were passed after the courts had ruled that laws 
criminalizing personal, private marijuana use were unconstitutional.158 
 
 156. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060 (2004) (current version ALASKA STAT. § 
11.71.060 (2012)). 
 157. Alabama’s anti-miscegenation statute, rendered unconstitutional by the 
United States Supreme Court in Loving v. Virgina, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), remained 
on the books until it was repealed by voter initiative in 2000. ALA. CONST. art. IV, 
§ 102 (annulled by Amendment 667 (2000). Twenty-one states still have adultery 
laws on the books. Jessica Feinberg, Exposing the Traditional Marriage Agenda, 7 
NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 301, 329 (2012) (“In the twenty-one states that still have the 
crime of adultery on the books, enforcement of these statutes has become 
exceedingly rare.”). In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court struck down a Texas sodomy 
statute, though the statute itself remains on the books with the annotation: “This 
section was declared unconstitutional.” 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 2011). A Colorado law making it a crime to deface the 
American flag also remains on the books over 30 years after it was struck down. 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-11-204 (West 2012); see People v. Vaughn, 514. P.2d 
1318, 1324 (Colo. 1973) (striking down law criminalizing flag desecration as 
unconstitutional). 
 158. A similarity can be drawn to the unsuccessful attempts to ban abortion 
through legislation that directly conflicts with Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
The South Dakota legislature passed a bill in 2006 that banned all abortion in the 
state. H.B. 1215, 81st Leg. (S.D. 2006) (concluding that life begins at conception 
and thus banning abortions in South Dakota). This bill never became law; it was 
overturned by the voters through a veto referendum. South Dakota Referred Law 6 
(2006), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/South_Dakota 
_Abortion_Ban_Referendum_(2006). In 2008, South Dakota voters were once 
again asked to vote on a bill that would ban all abortion in the state. See South 
Dakota Initiative Measure 11 (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/ 
index.php/South_Dakota_Abortion_Ban,_Initiated_Measure_11_(2008). The 
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Regardless, this legislative action does not diminish the value of the 
judicial decisions previously issued on nearly identical statutes. Under 
these rulings, adults may possess less than four ounces of marijuana in 
their homes for purely personal, non-commercial use.159 Under the 
current laws, the following are illegal: transporting marijuana out of the 
home;160 driving under the influence of marijuana;161 buying or selling 
any amount of marijuana;162 possessing marijuana in an amount 
indicative of an intent to sell;163 cooperatively growing and distributing 
marijuana, even if the growing operation was intended only for the 
personal use of those involved;164 giving away marijuana;165 and 
possessing marijuana if the possessor is a minor.166 
II. THE CONTINUING VITALITY OF RAVIN V. STATE 
Several layers of legal protection secure the continuing vitality of 
Ravin v. State. Current Alaska Department of Law policy suggests that 
no one should be arrested (or subsequently prosecuted) for conduct 
protected by Ravin.167 If followed, that policy will make it impossible for 
 
purpose of these measures was to overturn Roe v. Wade. See Nicholas Riccardi, 
Initiatives to Curb Abortion Defeated, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A18, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/05/nation/na-states5 (“The most 
prominent initiative was a measure put on the ballot in South Dakota to outlaw 
most abortions in hope of triggering a Supreme Court showdown over the 
landmark 1973 case Roe vs. Wade.”); Evelyn Nieves, S.D. Abortion Bill Takes Aim 
at ‘Roe,’ WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/02/22/AR2006022202424.html (“South Dakota 
lawmakers yesterday approved the nation’s most far-reaching ban on abortion, 
setting the stage for new legal challenges that its supporters say they hope lead 
to an overturning of Roe v. Wade.”). That the statutes to be created by these 
ballot measures would be facially unconstitutional is almost irrelevant to those 
who supported the measures—the purpose was to get the issue in front of 
judges who might now be inclined to overturn Roe. Id. 
 159. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975); Noy, 83 P.3d at 543. 
 160. Belgarde v. State, 543 P.2d 206, 207 (Alaska 1975) (clarifying that Ravin 
does not protect possession of marijuana in a public place). 
 161. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 511. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id.; see also Brown v. State, 565 P.2d 179, 180 (Alaska 1977) (reaffirming 
that Ravin offers no constitutional protection regarding the buying or selling of 
marijuana). 
 164. Garhart v. State, 147 P.3d 751, 751 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006). 
 165. Wright v. State, 651 P.2d 846, 849 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (finding the 
noncommercial transfer of marijuana falls within the statutory prohibition 
against distribution of marijuana). 
 166. See Allam v. State, 830 P.2d 435, 441 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (finding the 
Alaska legislature acted constitutionally when it established a minimum age for 
possession and use of marijuana). 
 167. New Marijuana Laws, ALASKA DEP’T OF LAW (May 12, 2006), 
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a court to consider a challenge to Ravin because State v. ACLU of Alaska 
requires prosecution under the new marijuana prohibition statutes as a 
condition of justiciability for a Ravin-based claim. Should a court 
eventually have occasion to revisit Ravin, stare decisis would then stand 
in and preserve the decision because all lower court judges must abide 
by Ravin. Further, stare decisis establishes a very high threshold that 
would have to be met before the Alaska Supreme Court could change 
course and deviate from its now thirty-seven year-old precedent. The 
court would have to be convinced that marijuana use has become such a 
threat to public health and welfare that the state has no choice but to 
completely proscribe it, even if that means reaching into the home and 
regulating private conduct. This standard would be difficult to meet as 
the scientific community is far from being in agreement about the 
dangers of marijuana use. 
Considering all of these factors, there is currently very little room 
for a court to take up this matter, let alone for the Alaska Supreme Court 
to overturn Ravin. 
A. Ripeness and Prosecutorial Discretion Insulate Ravin from 
Future Challenges 
Following State v. ACLU of Alaska, any challenge to the 
constitutionality of Alaska’s new criminal marijuana statute, and 
thereby an opportunity for a court to consider Ravin, must await an 
actual prosecution under that statute.168 Such a case will not easily 
present itself. The Alaska Supreme Court notes that arrests and 
prosecutions for misdemeanor marijuana possession in Alaska are 
historically rare.169 Even if an activist was willing to be subject to arrest 
 
http://law.alaska.gov/press/releases/2006/051206-Marijuana.html. 
 168. State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 367 (Alaska 2009). The language 
contemplates any reconsideration of Ravin arising in the criminal context, which 
does not provide a direct path back to the Alaska Supreme Court. Under 
Alaska’s Appellate Procedure Rules, the Alaska Court of Appeals hears all 
appeals from final decisions by the superior court or the district court in criminal 
cases. ALASKA R. APP. P. 202(b) (2012); ALASKA STAT. § 22.07.020 (2012). The 
Alaska Supreme Court maintains discretionary review of court of appeals 
decisions. As explained, the Alaska Supreme Court could continue to decline to 
consider any Ravin-related issues. 
 169. See ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d at 371 (“[P]rosecutors and police 
departments generally are not interested in pursuing individuals who merely 
possess small quantities of marijuana in their home for personal use.”). From 
2006 to 2008 the State filed just over 3,000 cases alleging violation of section 
11.71.060 of Alaska Statutes (Misconduct Involving a Controlled Substance in the 
Sixth Degree—Possession of Marijuana). Id. at 377. This information does not 
identify the number of cases, if any, that included conduct protected under 
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in order to mount a constitutional challenge as Irwin Ravin did,170 that 
would not guarantee judicial review. “[P]rosecutors and police 
departments generally are not interested in pursuing individuals who 
merely possess small quantities of marijuana in their home for personal 
use.”171 To the extent that individuals are arrested for such conduct, it is 
often incident to investigation of other crimes172 and the charges are 
typically dropped before trial.173 This practice is consistent with the fact 
 
Ravin. At this time there are no comprehensive empirical studies identifying the 
number of arrests or prosecutions for misdemeanor marijuana possession that 
stemmed from personal use and possession of less than four ounces of 
marijuana in the home by adults. 
 170. See Richard Mauer, Recriminalization—Drug War, Right To Privacy Face 
Off, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 28, 1990, at M17 (discussing libertarian 
activists willing to undergo arrest in order to challenge the statute on 
constitutional grounds); Jill Burke, Irwin Ravin, Alaska Marijuana Rights Activist, 
Dies, ALASKA DISPATCH (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.alaskadispatch.com/ 
article/irwin-ravin-alaska-marijuana-rights-activist-dies (reporting the death of 
Irwin Ravin and discussing his life as a marijuana activist); James Halpin, 
Attorney Who Forced Marijuana Issue, Dies in Anchorage, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS 
(Apr. 13, 2010, 11:37 AM), http://www.adn.com/2010/04/12/1223213/ 
attorney-who-forced-marijuana.html (reporting the death of Irwin Ravin and 
discussing his life as a marijuana activist); Marijuana Lawyer Irwin Ravin Dies in 
Anchorage, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Apr. 14, 2010),  http://juneauempire.com/stories 
/041410/sta_608718010.shtml (reporting the death of Irwin Ravin and 
discussing his life as a marijuana activist). 
 171. State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d at 371 (citing Ravin, 537 P.2d at 511 
n.70). 
 172. See Ravin, 537 P.2d at 511 n.70 (“Statistics indicate that few arrests for 
simple possession occur in the home except when other crimes are 
simultaneously being investigated. The trend in general in law enforcement 
seems to be toward minimal effort against simple users of marijuana, and 
concentration of efforts against dealers and users of more dangerous 
substances.”). 
 173. The recent case of Eva Anniskett of Point Lay, Alaska is illustrative: 
“After getting a tip on March 28, [2011,] North Slope Borough police arrived at 
Anniskett’s house and ‘obtained consent to search her home,’ according to a 
press release from the department. Police found 1 gram of marijuana . . . . They 
forwarded a charge of sixth-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance 
to the district attorney’s office in Barrow, a class B misdemeanor.” Alex 
DeMarban, Small Marijuana Bust on North Slope Raises Eyebrows at ACLU, THE 
ARCTIC SOUNDER (Apr. 1, 2011, 3:55 PM), http://www.thearcticsounder.com 
/article/1113small_marijuana_bust_on_north_slope_raises. Ms. Anniskett was 
not prosecuted—the state declined to charge her with a crime—and even if Ms. 
Anniskett were tried, the charges could not have survived a dismissal motion in 
light of the controlling Ravin and Noy decisions. See also Jill Burke, New Alaska 
Medical Marijuana Clinic Banks on Hazy Enforcement Policies, ALASKA DISPATCH 
(July 13, 2012), http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/new-alaska-medical-
marijuana-clinic-banks-hazy-enforcement-policies (noting that “[a]t least three 
Alaskans busted on pot charges have had their court cases tossed based on 
Ravin’s precedent”). However, following State v. ACLU of Alaska, there remains 
an open question as to whether the facts of Ms. Anniksett’s situation would 
create a justiciable civil case challenging the constitutionality of the 2006 
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that Alaskans have had the right to private personal marijuana use 
under state law since 1975. 
Just before the 2006 amendments to Alaska’s criminal marijuana 
statutes were signed into law by the Governor, the Alaska Attorney 
General instructed all law enforcement officers in the state to continue to 
respect an adult’s right to “nonpublic possession of less than four 
ounces of marijuana by adults.”174 Under this non-enforcement policy, 
no one was to be arrested for conduct protected by Ravin and Noy but 
prohibited by “[t]he new marijuana law.”175 This directive was to remain 
in place until the courts had an opportunity to address the 
constitutionality of the new law.176 There is no record of the non-
enforcement policy being repealed, and its existence places another 
barrier between Ravin and the courts.177 
The non-enforcement policy acknowledged respect for the 
separation of powers and the proper roles of the executive and 
legislature vis-à-vis the judiciary.178 Authorities intended for the policy 
 
amendments. 
 174.  New Marijuana Laws, ALASKA DEP’T OF LAW (May 12, 2006), 
http://law.alaska.gov/press/releases/2006/051206-Marijuana.html; see also 
State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d at 380 n.40 (Carpeneti, J., dissenting) (stating 
that “[i]ndeed, today’s opinion may put enforcement of the new laws on hold 
indefinitely. Following enactment of the current law, the attorney general issued 
a law enforcement bulletin” and quoting the bulletin at length). 
 175.  New Marijuana Laws, supra note 174 (“The new marijuana laws created 
by House Bill 149, which will soon be signed by Governor Murkowski, will 
immediately affect those who possess four ounces or more, but will make no 
immediate change in police authority regarding personal possession of under 
four ounces by adults in homes.”). 
 176.  See id. (“The state will vigorously litigate all these legal issues because 
it’s important that the courts overrule these prior decisions. . . . [But, w]e live 
under the rule of law, and full implementation of the marijuana law is ultimately 
up to the courts.”). 
 177.  A search of Department of Law Press Releases shows that no further 
public statements regarding marijuana prosecution have been issued. See Press 
Releases, ALASKA DEP’T OF LAW, http://www.law.alaska.gov/press/news.html 
(providing searchable database of press releases and containing no further 
public statements regarding marijuana prosecution). Further, in 2011, the Alaska 
Department of Law’s spokesman was unaware “of anyone who’s been 
prosecuted by the state for possessing small amounts” of marijuana. DeMarban, 
supra note 173. That statement is consistent with the non-enforcement policy. 
However, whether the directive is strictly followed in practice throughout the 
state is uncertain. Two recent comments indicate that it is not. The Anchorage 
Police Department spokesperson stated unequivocally that anyone found with 
any marijuana in their homes would be arrested unless they were a registered 
medical marijuana user. An Alaska State Assistant District Attorney confirmed 
this view of the law, but explained that decisions to prosecute would be made 
“case by case.” Burke, supra note 173. 
 178.  No Alaska Attorney General opinion addressing the 2006 Amendments 
has been issued, but the May 2006 policy directive follows the logic of a 1989 
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to shield individuals from the risk of prosecution for conduct that was 
still constitutionally protected, which was necessary during a confusing 
time. Indeed, this may have initially saved Alaska’s strong privacy 
protections from becoming lost in a constitutional Twilight Zone—a 
limbo where no citizen could be truly sure what the law meant or what 
his or her rights are. But the policy did not contemplate the Alaska 
Supreme Court’s eventual ruling on ripeness in State v. ACLU of Alaska. 
It now couples with that decision to block any clear path for a court to 
review Alaska’s personal use marijuana laws. It creates a legal Catch-22: 
Alaska courts cannot address the constitutionality of the 2006 
amendments as they apply to conduct protected by Ravin until law 
enforcement starts arresting people for possession of small amounts of 
marijuana in their homes. Under current policy, law enforcement should 
not arrest anyone for possession of small amounts of marijuana in their 
homes until the courts have addressed the constitutionality of the 2006 
amendments. As Justice Carpeneti noted in his dissent in State v. ACLU 
of Alaska, “today’s opinion may put enforcement of the new laws on 
hold indefinitely.”179 
The executive branch of the Alaska government is now squarely in 
the middle of the Ravin debate. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in 
which a state or local law enforcement officer completes an arrest and 
triggers Ravin litigation, regardless of the Alaska Attorney General’s 
policy directive.180 And the Attorney General could certainly revise the 
non-enforcement policy and encourage prosecution of low-level 
marijuana offenses. This would open the door for a court to potentially 
reconsider Ravin, but making such a change solely to provide a distant 
opportunity for a court to review the 2006 amendments would come at a 
great cost. First, it could significantly shift the Department of Law’s 
practice away from what it was before the directive, when simple 
possession of small amounts of marijuana in private was a nonexistent 
prosecutorial priority.181 This would be a poor use of investigative and 
 
Alaska Attorney General opinion discussing the 1990 Initiative.  Winters, supra 
note 3, at 342 (citing ALASKA OP. ATT’Y GEN. 227 (1989)). In that opinion the 
Attorney General did not state whether or not the Initiative was constitutional 
because “a review of the substantive constitutionality of a bill . . . must await 
post-enactment litigation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 179.  ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d at 380 n.40 (Carpeneti, J., dissenting). 
 180. See DeMarban supra note 173; Burke supra note 173. 
 181.  See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 n.70 (Alaska 1975) (“Statistics 
indicate that few arrests for simple possession occur in the home except when 
other crimes are simultaneously being investigated. The trend in general in law 
enforcement seems to be toward minimal effort against simple users of 
marijuana, and concentration of efforts against dealers and users of more 
dangerous substances.”). 
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prosecutorial resources.182 Second, it would charge Alaska’s law 
enforcement agencies with the awkward task of having to enforce what 
are in effect dead letter statutes that compromise individual privacy 
rights. Third, and most importantly, it would chill the right of privacy 
by placing Alaskans in fear of prosecution for engaging in what is still 
constitutionally protected conduct.183 Ultimately, such a decision would 
create more problems than it would solve, especially in light of the very 
high threshold that must be met before the Alaska Supreme Court could 
even consider overturning Ravin, as discussed in detail below. A more 
prudent course would be for the Attorney General to confer with other 
state law enforcement officials and announce either continued respect 
for the 2006 policy directive or a revised marijuana enforcement 
policy.184 But if the Attorney General were to formally dissolve the non-
enforcement policy, he or she should do so with great caution and clear 
 
 182. See SCOTT  W. BATES, THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF MARIJUANA 
LEGALIZATION IN ALASKA 27 (2004) (“[M]arijuana prohibition costs the State of 
Alaska well over $24 million annually in direct and indirect costs of 
enforcement.”); see also Alex Kreit, Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on 
Federal Drug Laws in an Age of State Reforms, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 555, 575 (2010) (“the 
federal effort to block state medical marijuana laws has . . . drained federal drug 
enforcement resources from other priorities”); Andrew J. LeVay, Note, Urgent 
Compassion: Medical Marijuana, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Medical Necessity 
Defense, 41 B.C. L. REV. 699, 744 (2000) (“precious law enforcement resources 
should be used to prevent violent crimes that endanger the safety of [the state’s] 
citizens”); Jesse Norris, THE EARNED RELEASE REVOLUTION: EARLY 
ASSESSMENTS AND STATE-LEVEL STRATEGIES, 95 Marq. L. Rev. (2012) 
1551, 1627 (“Several cities and states have recently decriminalized or are 
currently considering decriminalizing marijuana, often motivated by the 
potential budgetary savings.”) 
 183.  See, e.g., ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d at 378 (Carpeneti, J., dissenting) 
(“Consider the individual who comes home one evening to find a window 
broken in his home and the door slightly ajar. The individual knows that he left 
a small container of marijuana in the open on his coffee table. He must now 
decide whether he should call the police and expose himself to prosecution for 
possession of less than one ounce of marijuana in his home, or enter the house 
by himself and risk encountering an intruder. . . . [The individual] currently 
engaging in activities that this court has previously declared [in Ravin and Noy] 
as protected under the Alaska Constitution will be chilled in the exercise of those 
activities by the very real risk of a state prosecution.”). 
 184.  It has been six years since the non-enforcement policy was implemented 
in 2006. During that time Alaska has had three Governors, five different 
Attorneys General, and numerous new prosecutors and police officers. The 
policy was implemented under Attorney General Marquez and Governor Frank 
Murkowski. See List of Governors of Alaska, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Governors_of_Alaska (last visited Sept. 
3, 2012) (listing all Governors of Alaska); see also Attorneys General of Alaska, 
STATE OF ALASKA DEP’T OF LAW, http://www.law.state.ak.us/ 
department/ag_past.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2012) (listing all Attorneys 
General of Alaska). 
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guidance as to what he or she expects from law enforcement in order to 
minimize inconsistent application of the state’s criminal marijuana laws. 
B. Alaska Lower Courts Remain Duty-Bound to Abide By Ravin 
The principle of stare decisis mandates that prior “decisions of 
higher courts take preceden[t] over the decisions of lower courts.”185 
Thus Ravin still controls every Alaska court’s review of a statute that 
penalizes private personal marijuana use.186 Though these decisions are 
not binding,187 several prior superior court cases have addressed 
conflicts with Ravin and guide how trial court judges should respond if 
the Alaska Department of Law were to rescind its directive requiring 
law enforcement agencies to respect Ravin and Noy and begin 
prosecuting individuals for possession of small amounts of marijuana in 
their homes. 
In 1992, Patrick McNeil was arrested for conduct that was banned 
by the 1990 Initiative but permitted under Ravin: he was an adult (22 
years old) in possession of a small amount of marijuana (0.21 grams, or 
0.0074 ounces) in his home for personal use.188 McNeil moved to 
suppress the evidence and dismiss the charges under Ravin.189 Superior 
Court Judge Michael A. Thompson agreed and dismissed the case, 
ruling that the statutes amended by the initiative that conflicted with 
Ravin were essentially legally irrelevant in light of stare decisis.190 Though 
the judge did consider the possibility that conditions had changed and a 
 
 185.  Klumb v. State, 712 P.2d 909, 913 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (“This follows 
the general rule that decisions of higher courts take precedence over the 
decisions of lower courts.”). 
 186.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1373 (E.D. 
Pa. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(“[O]nly [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents . . . .”). 
 187.  See Ostrosky v. Alaska, 913 F.2d 590, 596 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Alaska 
superior court decisions are not binding on other Alaska superior courts.”). 
 188.   State v. McNeil, No. 1KE-93-947 CR, at *1 (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 
1993). 
 189.  Id. at *2 (“Defendant has moved to suppress the evidence taken under 
the warrant on the grounds that there was insufficient probably [sic] cause for 
the issue of the warrant; the search exceeded the scope of the warrant; and, 
finally, that AS 11.71.060(a)(1) violates article I, Section 22 of the State 
Constitution (the right to privacy) inasmuch as it criminalizes the personal 
possession of marijuana by adults for use in one’s home.”). 
 190.  Id. at *6; see also Winters, supra note 3, at 329 (“[T]he prosecution in 
McNeil presented no evidence to suggest that new scientific data regarding the 
effects of marijuana invalidated the basis for the Ravin decision. Therefore, Judge 
Thompson felt he had ‘no basis to overrule or even qualify the Ravin decision’ 
and he dismissed the charges against McNeil.’”). 
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departure from Ravin was justified: “[s]cience marches on. Perhaps there 
is now in existence sufficient evidence in the scientific community to 
persuade [the supreme court] that the State does have an adequate 
justification to intrude on individual privacy in the manner sought by 
[the statute].”191 The State did not present any such evidence, nor make 
any argument on this point.192 Accordingly, the judge had “no basis to 
overrule or even qualify the Ravin decision.”193 
Scientific evidence regarding the health and social effects of 
marijuana later played a role in State v. Mahle.194  Mahle was indicted on 
numerous weapons and controlled substance charges in 2000.195 In 2006, 
while awaiting sentencing, he moved to suppress evidence under the 
Crocker rule.196 In response the State sought to present scientific evidence 
that marijuana was a greater public health concern than it was when 
Ravin was decided.197 The State asserted that it could establish that 
marijuana was now so dangerous that Alaska law should be changed to 
criminalize even possession of small amounts of marijuana in the home 
for personal use.198 The State’s rationale was that if it could establish that 
Ravin was no longer good law, then the subsequent decisions in Noy and 
Crocker would no longer be binding and there would be no legal 
justification to grant Mahle’s suppression motion.199 Judge Volland 
denied the State’s request for a “Ravin Hearing.”200 The judge declared 
that stare decisis left him without authority to overrule Ravin and that 
even if the state’s new research was well founded, it did “not somehow 
 
 191.  McNeil, No. 1KE-93-947 CR, at *6. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  No. 3:06-cv-00255 JWS, 2007 WL 2021814 (D. Alaska July 10, 2007). 
 195.  See id. at *1 (“The charges were based on evidence seized after a series of 
four search warrants were executed at his home . . . .[And] Mahle was convicted 
of most of the charges.”). 
 196.  Id.; see also State v. Crocker, 97 P.3d 93, 94 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (“[A] 
judicial officer should not issue a warrant to search a person’s home for evidence 
of marijuana possession unless the State’s warrant application establishes 
probable cause to believe that the person’s possession of marijuana exceeds the 
scope of the possession that is constitutionally protected under Ravin.”). 
 197.  Mahle requested a hearing in order to establish that the warrant was 
issued absent sufficient probable cause to believe that he was engaged in illegal 
conduct. The state opposed Mahle’s motion to suppress and joined his request 
for an evidentiary hearing.  However, in its request, the state took the 
extraordinary step of requesting its own evidentiary hearing on an issue Mahle 
did not even raise.  The State “requested an evidentiary hearing to show 
sufficient justification for the criminalization of the possession [of] any amount 
of marijuana, regardless of where it occurs.” Order Denying Ravin Hearing at 1, 
State v. Mahle, Case No. 3AN-S00-8212 CR, at *1 (Mar. 29, 2006). 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. at *3. 
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empower this court to ignore legal precedent.”201 Judge Volland also 
noted that the scientific studies the State wanted him to consider were 
the same studies the State put before the supreme court in its 
unsuccessful Petition for Hearing in Noy.202 Judge Volland saw “no 
compelling reason to do that which the Alaska Supreme Court has 
expressly declined to do.”203 This ruling was consistent with a lower 
court’s obligation to apply precedent even in light of new evidence that 
might impact the decision, as trial courts may not circumvent stare 
decisis by speculating on how such evidence might be viewed by the 
Alaska Supreme Court.204 
Similarly, Judge Collins’ ruling in ACLU of Alaska v. State provides a 
roadmap for how a trial court should handle a ripe challenge to the 
state’s criminal marijuana statutes: the challenged statutes should be 
declared unconstitutional to the extent they conflict with Ravin and its 
progeny.205 The court should not defer to legislative findings and should 
not acquiesce to a request for an evidentiary hearing absent specific 
direction from the Supreme Court.206 Ravin does not provide a 
framework for trial courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether 
current data about marijuana establishes that the government has a 
sufficient interest in prohibiting possession of small amounts of 
 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id. at *2. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  See United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F.3d 411, 414 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“[S]peculation does not permit us to ignore controlling Supreme Court 
authority.”); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 238 (1997) (“The trial court 
acted within its discretion in entertaining the motion with supporting 
allegations, but it was also correct to recognize that the motion had to be denied 
unless and until this Court reinterpreted the binding precedent.”); Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a 
precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on 
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should 
follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of 
overruling its own decisions.”); United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 986 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (“[W]e cannot properly overrule this course of precedent in 
anticipation of a new directive that the Court has not yet issued.”); but see  PNC 
Bank Corp. v. W.C.A.B. (Stamos), 831 A.2d 1269, 1282 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) 
(“[M]any authorities have suggested that in an appropriate case ‘anticipatory 
overruling’ may be not only permissible, but an obligation . . . .We believe that 
the best view is that such action should be taken only in the extraordinary 
circumstance in which there can be no serious question as to our Supreme 
Court’s intention.”). 
 205.  See generally ACLU of Alaska v. State, No. IJU-06-793 CI, 2006 WL 
6457870 (Alaska Super. Ct. July 10, 2006). 
 206.  See id. at *12 (“[Ravin] is the law until and unless the supreme court takes 
contrary action.”). 
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marijuana by adults in their homes.207 Thus, while “[t]he State remains 
free to challenge the continuing vitality of Ravin,”208 trial courts are not 
required to hold an evidentiary hearing whenever the State argues it has 
new scientific evidence, nor must the courts blindly defer to legislative 
findings on this point. It is up to the Alaska Supreme Court alone to 
determine if the state has met the factual burden to warrant revisiting 
Ravin.209 Trial courts remain “duty bound” to follow Ravin “[u]nless and 
until the supreme court directs otherwise.”210 
C. The Circumstances Under Which The Alaska Supreme Court Can 
Overturn Ravin Are Closely Circumscribed 
The Alaska Supreme Court must employ a stringent analysis before 
it can deviate from one of its previous rulings. Stare decisis cautions the 
court to not “lightly overrule [its] past decisions.”211 But this doctrine is 
not a rigid paradigm or an “inexorable command.”212  It allows for legal 
 
 207.  Id.; see also Noy II, 83 P.3d 545, 546–47 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (“The Ravin 
decision does not speak of an affirmative defense of the type proposed by the 
State in its petition for rehearing, nor does the Ravin opinion describe itself as 
establishing case-specific limits on the State’s enforcement of marijuana 
statutes.”); but see Agostini, 521 U.S. at 238 (“The trial court acted within its 
discretion in entertaining the motion with supporting allegations, but it was also 
correct to recognize that the motion had to be denied unless and until this Court 
reinterpreted the binding precedent.”). In the interests of judicial economy, it 
would be unwise to hold a lengthy evidentiary hearing on the science of the 
health and social effects of marijuana without prior direction from the Supreme 
Court. 
 208.  Noy II, 83 P.3d at 549. 
 209.  Brown v. Board of Education underscores the proper role of lower courts 
vis-à-vis the Supreme Court. 347 U.S. 483, 486–88 (1954) (asserting that lower 
courts are bound by U.S. Supreme Court precedent). Brown was actually a 
consolidated opinion covering four class action cases. Id. In three of the cases, 
federal district courts denied relief to the plaintiffs and upheld the “separate but 
equal” doctrine announced in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), even though 
there was social science evidence establishing that “[s]egregation of white and 
colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored 
children.” Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 
494 n.10 (stating that a state supreme court likewise held that it must adhere to 
Plessy, but ordered relief for the plaintiffs on other grounds). The decision in 
Brown overruled longstanding precedent, but it was the Supreme Court – and 
not a lower court – that issued the ruling; the lower courts were bound by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Plessy. The same respect for the Alaska Supreme 
Court’s role should be in place here: it is the only court with the power to 
overrule Ravin or to order a hearing to consider facts related to whether it 
should be overruled. 
 210.  ACLU of Alaska v. State, No. IJU-06-793 CI, 2006 WL 6457870, at *9 
(Alaska Super. Ct. July 10, 2006). 
 211.  State v. Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604, 610 (Alaska 1986). 
 212.  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Although adherence to 
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theory to evolve as society does: courts are free to reinterpret their own 
holdings in light of changed facts, circumstances, norms, and social 
conditions.213 “[S]tare decisis is a practical, flexible command that 
balances our community’s competing interests in the stability of legal 
norms and the need to adapt those norms to society’s changing 
demands.”214 Still, the circumstances under which a prior decision can 
be invalidated are closely circumscribed. The Alaska Supreme Court 
“will overrule a decision only when convinced: (1) ‘that the rule was 
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed 
conditions,’ and (2) ‘that more good than harm would result from 
a departure from precedent.’”215 Moreover, the Court will not reverse its 
precedent unless it is “clearly convinced” that both prongs of the 
standard have been met.216 
Here, there is no support for the argument that Ravin was 
“originally erroneous.”217 A number of trial courts, the Alaska Court of 
Appeals, and the Alaska Supreme Court have consistently affirmed 
Ravin’s interpretation of the Alaska Constitution’s right of privacy218 and 
 
the doctrine of stare decisis is usually the best policy, the doctrine is not an 
inexorable command.  This Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent 
when governing decisions are unworkable or badly reasoned.”); see also 
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (“[Stare decisis] is a principle of 
policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.”); 
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy . . . [However,] in cases 
involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is 
practically impossible, this court has often overruled its earlier decisions.”). 
 213.  See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
 214.  Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Alaska 
1993); see also State v. United Cook Inlet Drift Ass’n, 895 P.2d 947, 953 (Alaska 
1995) (“[T]he judicial doctrine of stare decisis accords the prior holdings of the 
highest courts of this State precedential value while still permitting the 
reconsideration of legal issues when conditions warrant.”) . 
 215.  State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 757–58 (Alaska 2011) (quoting Sheehan, 852 
P.2d at 1176) (citation omitted). 
 216.  See Dunlop, 721 P.2d at 610 (quoting State v. Souter, 606 P.3d 399, 400 
(Alaska 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lawson v. Lawson, 
108 P.3d 883, 887–88 (Alaska 2005) (applying both prongs of the stare decisis 
standard to a prior opinion permitting judicial promulgation of child-support 
rules and declining to overrule that decision). 
 217.  Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (1993) overturning Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and 
it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent.”). 
 218.  See, e.g., Brown v. Ely, 14 P.3d 257, 260 (Alaska 2000) (“We have not 
overruled Ravin.”); Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1135 
(Alaska 1989) (recognizing the “fundamental right” of privacy protects the 
personal use of marijuana by adults in the home) (quoting Ravin, 537 P.2d at 502) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538, 544 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 2003) (invalidating a statute that purported to criminalize any and all 
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the balancing analysis employed in Ravin “has become the trademark of 
Alaska’s constitutional cases.”219 The recent challenges to the continuing 
vitality of Ravin have instead focused on the “changed conditions” 
prong of the stare decisis test. “Changed conditions” exist when “related 
principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no 
more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine, [or] facts have so changed 
or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of 
significant application.”220 With this in mind, the argument for 
overturning Ravin follows this logic: (1) marijuana is much more potent 
and dangerous now than it was when Ravin was decided; (2) increased 
use of such higher potency marijuana has led to significant negative 
health and social consequences; (3) these negative health and social 
effects give the state an interest sufficient to justify restricting all 
personal marijuana use and possession, even that by adults in the 
privacy of their homes.221 
This theory was explicit in Ravin itself. The court’s decision was 
based on analysis of contemporaneous scientific evidence concerning the 
social and health effects of marijuana use. The court found that the 
effects of the lower-potency marijuana that was commonly consumed in 
the United States at the time were “not serious enough to justify 
widespread concern. ”222 The court did not see “any great likelihood of a 
significant shift in use to the more potent” forms of marijuana available 
 
marijuana possession); Noy II, 83 P.3d 545, 549 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (declining 
rehearing Noy because that case rightfully “implement[ed] the supreme court’s 
constitutional ruling in Ravin”); Order, State v. Noy, Supreme Court No. S-11297 
(Sept. 7, 2004); State v. Crocker, 97 P.3d 93, 95 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (“Not all 
marijuana possession is a crime in Alaska.”); State v. McNeil, No. 1KE-93-947 
CR, at *6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 1993) (rejecting application of section 
11.71.060 of the Alaska Statutes that criminalized all possession of marijuana); 
see also, Fraternal Order of Eagles v. City & Borough of Juneau, 254 P.3d 348, 357 
(Alaska 2011) (finding that a local smoking ordinance that prohibited smoking 
cigarettes in private clubs that offered food and alcohol for sale did not run afoul 
of the right to privacy as interpreted in Ravin “because [a private club] is not a 
home.”). 
 219.  Orlansky & Feldman, supra note 27, at 10–11 (“In the balancing analysis 
that has become the trademark of Alaska’s constitutional cases, justice 
Rabinowitz declared that personal privacy may be restricted by the state only if 
the state can meet its substantial burden by demonstrating a legitimate state 
interest in proscribing the private use of marijuana.”). 
 220.  Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Alaska 
1993) (alteration in original) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 221.  State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 367 (Alaska 2009) (setting out 
findings asserted by the State supporting the argument to overturn Ravin based 
on factual findings and developments). 
 222.  Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 590–91 (Alaska 1975). 
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in other countries.223 But the court cautioned, “[i]f such a shift were to 
occur, then marijuana use could be characterized as a serious health 
problem.”224 Yet a mere shift alone will not be sufficient. The Ravin 
decision adds another demanding level of inquiry that must be met 
before the changed conditions prong of the stare decisis test can be 
satisfied: “The state must demonstrate a need based on proof that the 
public health or welfare will in fact suffer if the [marijuana] controls are 
not applied.”225 
Expert opinions continue to vary greatly on whether such a 
conclusive link exists.226 In Ravin, the court found the evidence of 
potential danger from marijuana use “contradictory and inconclusive”—
not nearly strong enough to outweigh the heightened privacy interests 
respected in Alaska.227 A review of the legislative record for the 2006 
amendments reveals a similar split.228 Despite the Legislature’s position 
that marijuana is more potent and harmful than it was in 1975, there is 
hardly a scientific consensus as to whether marijuana poses significant 
danger to the user or others.229 Yet this is precisely what must be proven 
 
 223.  Id. at 510 n.64. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Id. at 511 (emphasis added). 
 226.  See Danovitch, supra note 132, at 92 (“Data on marijuana related arrests 
and incarceration is inconsistent, but many experts suggest that the adverse 
consequences of criminal sanctions are greater than the adverse consequences of 
marijuana.”). 
 227.  Orlansky & Feldman, supra note 27, at 11. 
 228.  In March, April, and May 2005, the Alaska Senate and House of 
Representatives held a number of public hearings and received documentary 
and testimonial evidence from proponents and opponents of marijuana 
decriminalization. See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text (summarizing 
legislative testimony regarding the 2006 amendments). 
 229.  The Alaska legislature itself is inconsistent on this point. Marijuana is 
still classified as a Schedule VIA drug in Alaska, a substance with “the lowest 
danger or probable danger to a person or the public.” Compare ALASKA STAT. § 
11.71.190 (a), (b) (2012), with § 11.71.160 (a), (f) (placing some marijuana 
compounds such as hashish and hashish oil in schedule IIIA with more 
dangerous substances). Despite the alleged dangers posed by the more potent 
modern forms of marijuana available, the Legislature did not reschedule 
marijuana when it amended the criminal penalties for marijuana use in 2006. 
Since the justification for recriminalizing all marijuana use was due to the 
increased dangers posed by marijuana use, rescheduling the drug at that time 
would have been logical.  Similarly, the Legislature has made no effort to amend 
the constitution to prohibit personal marijuana use and possession. Given the 
unsuccessful ballot initiatives aimed at decriminalizing marijuana in 2000 and 
2004, the possibility that such an amendment would ultimately pass cannot be 
dismissed. However, recent polling indicates that voters nationwide favor 
legalizing and regulating marijuana. 56% Favor Legalizing, Regulating Marijuana, 
RASMUSSEN REPORTS (May 17, 2012), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/ 
public_content/lifestyle/general_lifestyle/may_2012/56_favor_legalizing_regul
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to overturn Ravin. Conversely, to uphold the decision, the court does not 
need to find that marijuana is less harmful than it was in 1975, or that it 
is even exactly the same as it was in 1975. Marijuana may be more 
potent now, and may involve other concerns that were not present in 
1975, but those facts alone will not automatically justify a blanket 
marijuana prohibition that extends to restrict an adult’s private choices 
in the home. Respect for the Ravin precedent means the ruling must 
stand unless there is proof that permitting adults to use small amounts 
of marijuana in the privacy of their homes creates a significant risk to 
public health and welfare.230 
To date, the “increased potency” theory for overturning Ravin has 
not been well received. Three times in the very recent past the Alaska 
Supreme Court has declined the chance to revisit Ravin, even when 
presented with new research purporting to show the increased health 
effects of marijuana.231 As Judge Volland wrote in State v. Mahle: 
[I]f there ever was an opportunity for the Supreme Court to 
reconsider its holding in Ravin, it was when faced with the 
State’s Petition [for Hearing in Noy]. Yet when presented with 
the most recent information the State has compiled regarding 
marijuana, and a direct opportunity to revisit Ravin v. State, the 
Alaska Supreme Court declined to do so.232 
Courts typically only reconsider past precedents in light of 
significantly changed social conditions, shifting values, better-informed 
legal analysis, or a combination thereof. These factors take on greater 
significance when the precedent at issue has been weakened by 
subsequent decisions.233 This is not the case with Ravin, however, as no 
 
ating_marijuana (finding that 56% of voters nationwide favor legalizing and 
regulating marijuana similar to the way alcohol and tobacco cigarettes are 
currently regulated). 
 230.  See Ravin, 537 P.2d at 511 (“The state must demonstrate a need based on 
proof that the public health or welfare will in fact suffer if the controls are not 
applied.”). 
 231.  Order, State v. Noy, Supreme Court No. S-11297 (Sept. 7, 2004); Order, 
State v. Crocker, Supreme Court No. S-11651 (Dec. 30, 2004); State v. ACLU of 
Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 373–74 (Alaska 2009) (relying on the supremacy of the CSA 
and the risk of federal prosecution to justify its decision to abstain from ruling 
on the merits of the parties’ claims). 
 232.  Order Denying Ravin Hearing at 2, State v. Mahle, Case No. 3AN-S00-
8212 CR, at 1 (Mar. 29, 2006). 
 233.  See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), overruling Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (overturning the “separate but equal” doctrine). In 
all of the cases that involved the “separate but equal” doctrine in the field of 
public graduate education after Plessy but prior to Brown, “inequality was found 
in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro 
students of the same educational qualifications.” Id. at 492 (citing Missouri ex 
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subsequent cases have weakened its holding.234 The continuing vitality 
of Ravin thus turns on the degree to which accepted views on the public 
health and social effects of marijuana have changed. 
The second prong of the stare decisis test, analyzing whether more 
good than harm would result from a departure from precedent, is also 
tied to changes in marijuana potency and usage patterns. As with Ravin 
itself, this question rests on a balance between privacy and public 
welfare, and if the scientific evidence is not convincing enough to satisfy 
the first prong of the test, then by definition the second prong cannot be 
met either. 
The second prong also requires the court to “balance the benefits of 
adopting a new rule against the benefits of stare decisis: providing 
guidance for the conduct of individuals, creating efficiency in litigation 
by avoiding the relitigation of decided issues, and maintaining public 
faith in the judiciary.”235 As the United States Supreme Court explained 
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,236 where it 
 
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of 
Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Ok. 
St. Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950)) The Court was on its way 
toward overturning Plessy when it considered Brown.See also Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 176, 559 (1986) 
(noting that “[t]he 25 States with laws prohibiting the conduct referenced in 
Bowers [were] reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against 
homosexual conduct.”). 
 234.  See, e.g., Brown v. Ely, 14 P.3d 257, 260 (Alaska 2000) (“We have not 
overruled Ravin.”); Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1135 
(Alaska 1989) (the “fundamental right” of privacy protects the personal use of 
marijuana by adults in the home) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Ravin, 537 P.2d at 502); Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538, 544 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) 
(invalidating a statute that purported to criminalize any and all marijuana 
possession); Noy II, 83 P.3d 545, 549 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (declining to rehear 
Noy because that case rightfully “implement[ed] the supreme court’s 
constitutional ruling in Ravin”); Order, State v. Noy, Supreme Court No. S-11297 
(Sept. 7, 2004); Crocker, 97 P.3d at 95 (“Not all marijuana possession is a crime in 
Alaska.”); Order, State v. Crocker, Supreme Court No. S-11651 (Dec. 30, 2004); 
State v. McNeil, No. 1KE-93-947 CR, at *6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 1993). 
(rejecting application of section 11.71.060 of the Alaska Statutes that criminalized 
all possession of marijuana); see also, Fraternal Order of Eagles v. City & Borough 
of Juneau, 254 P.3d 348, 357 (Alaska 2011) (finding that a local smoking 
ordinance that prohibited smoking cigarettes in private clubs that offered food 
and alcohol for sale did not run afoul of the right to privacy as interpreted in 
Ravin “because [a private club] is not a home.”). 
 235. State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 761–62 (Alaska 2011); see also Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 853 (1992) (“The reservations any of 
us may have in reaffirming the central holding of Roe [v. Wade] are outweighed 
by the explication of individual liberty we have given combined with the force 
of stare decisis”). 
 236. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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was asked to consider overruling its landmark decision in Roe v. Wade:237 
[W]hatever the premises of opposition may be, only the most 
convincing justification under accepted standards of precedent 
could suffice to demonstrate that a later decision overruling the 
first was anything but a surrender to political pressure, and an 
unjustified repudiation of the principle on which the Court 
staked its authority in the first instance.  So to overrule under 
fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine 
a watershed decision would subvert the Court’s legitimacy 
beyond any serious question.238 
The historical value of Ravin is certainly a factor the court must 
consider. Ravin was the watershed decision in Alaska privacy rights 
jurisprudence. It established the cornerstone principle that the Alaska 
Constitution provides greater protection for individual privacy than the 
U.S. Constitution.239 This is not to say that Ravin should be upheld 
simply because of its place in history—that is antithetical to the stare 
decisis analysis. But given its prominence, the court should be very 
cautious when considering deviating from such an entrenched holding. 
III. ADMINISTERING AND IMPLEMENTING RAVIN 
The current legal landscape in Alaska insulates Ravin from being 
easily overturned, but issues related to Ravin are still present. 
Implementing the decision remains subject to legislative oversight and 
requires continued judicial guidance. This Part explains that a full and 
objective review of the health and social effects of marijuana use should 
occur outside of the political arena. The Alaska courts should not blindly 
defer to legislative findings on this matter. However, the Legislature still 
plays an important role in regulating marijuana use by adults in the 
privacy of their homes. For instance, the four-ounce personal use ceiling 
is not a constitutional imperative. It was a legislative determination and 
the Alaska Legislature retains the ability to further define the contours 
of personal marijuana use in the home. Additionally, the ability of state 
law enforcement officers to investigate activity that falls outside the 
scope of Ravin continues to evolve, particularly with respect to search 
warrants involving the perception of marijuana odor. The smell of 
marijuana alone will not establish probable cause to search a home, but 
 
 237. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (declaring Texas criminal statutes prohibiting 
abortions at any stage of pregnancy except to save the life of the mother are 
unconstitutional). 
 238. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867. 
 239.  See supra Part I.1. 
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the courts have yet to determine the precise weight to accord data on the 
correlation between marijuana odor and the quantity of marijuana 
present within a residence. 
A.  The Alaska Legislature Can Determine What Constitutes A Small 
Amount of Marijuana 
The Alaska Constitution does not confer a fundamental right to 
smoke marijuana.240 Rather, Alaskans “have a heightened expectation of 
privacy with respect to their personal activities within their home,” 
which encompasses the ability to possess marijuana for personal use.241 
That expectation of privacy is not absolute—it just limits the extent to 
which the State can regulate private conduct in the home. The source of 
that expectation, the Alaska Constitution’s privacy clause, directly 
grants the Legislature the power to “implement” the right of privacy.242 
If the Legislature is going to regulate on a far end of the spectrum and 
ban all marijuana use, including use by adults in the home, it must meet 
a very demanding standard. However, if it is simply applying Ravin and 
attempting to define the contours of personal marijuana use, the 
standard is much more lenient. In Walker v. State,243 the Alaska Court of 
Appeals recognized that “the legislature . . . has the power to set 
reasonable limits on the amount of marijuana that people can possess for 
personal use in their homes.”244 This includes determining the quantity 
of marijuana that is indicative of commercial activity and prohibiting the 
corresponding possession of such an amount. 245 
Even though what constitutes a “reasonable” limit on personal 
marijuana use does not have a precise judicial definition, so long as 
Ravin retains its vitality, the legislature cannot ban all personal 
marijuana possession—it cannot set a bright-line limit at “none.” There 
 
 240.  See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 502 (Alaska 1975) (“Few would believe 
they have been deprived of something of critical importance if deprived of 
marijuana.”). 
 241.  Walker v. State, 991 P.2d 799, 801 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999). 
 242.  ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22. 
 243.   991 P.2d 799 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999). 
 244.  Id. at 802. 
 245.  See id. at 803 (“The Ravin decision itself does not elaborate on what 
amount of marijuana might constitute an ‘amount . . . indicative of intent to sell.’  
That is, the court did not specify the dividing line where, because of the amount 
of marijuana involved, the legislature can reasonably regulate personal 
possession of marijuana in the home, even in the absence of an intent to sell.  We 
need not establish a precise dividing line either.”); Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538, 
542–43 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (noting Ravin’s acknowledgement that the 
legislature could prohibit amounts indicative of an intent to sell rather than 
possession for personal use). 
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must be some allowance for personal marijuana possession in the home 
by adults. This principle is borne out by several cases in which Alaska 
appellate courts have upheld legislatively-imposed restrictions on 
private marijuana possession that fell short of an outright ban. In Brown 
v. State,246 the Alaska Supreme Court confirmed that Ravin offered no 
constitutional protection against the buying or selling of marijuana and 
that the legislature could make such activity a crime.247 In Garhart v. 
State,248 the court further held that this was true even if the purchaser 
intended to take the marijuana home and use it for personal purposes.249 
In Walker v. State,250 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that a statute that 
prohibited all possession of eight ounces or more of marijuana was 
constitutional, as that amount was indicative of intent to sell.251 In Noy, 
the Court of Appeals struck down a blanket marijuana prohibition, but 
upheld the Legislature’s previous determination that possession of four 
ounces or more of marijuana could be prohibited because that amount 
was presumptively indicative of commercial use.252 In Hotrum v. State,253 
the court of appeals determined that the Legislature could prohibit 
possession of 25 or more marijuana plants, regardless of their size or 
weight.254 
These decisions respect the Legislature’s role in implementing the 
right of privacy and are consistent with the notion that the courts must 
pay deference to the decision of a co-equal branch of government.255 
 
 246.   565 P.2d 179 (Alaska 1977). 
 247.  Id. at 180 (quoting Ravin’s assertion that the Alaska constitution does not 
protect an individual’s right to sell or distribute marijuana). 
 248.  147 P.3d 746 (Alaska Ct. App.  2006). 
 249.  Id. at 751 (rejecting the argument that the Alaska constitution protects 
the cooperative growing and distribution of marijuana if the marijuana is 
intended solely for the personal use of the people involved in the growing and 
distribution activities under Ravin). 
 250.   991 P.2d 799 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999). 
 251.  Id. at 803 (“eight ounces or more of marijuana is an amount large 
enough to fall within the Ravin court’s category of ‘indicative of intent to sell.’”). 
 252.  Noy, 83 P.3d at 543 (“we conclude that the legislature’s four-ounce 
dividing line is presumptively constitutional under Ravin.”). 
 253.  130 P.3d 965 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006). 
 254.  See id. at 970 (the legislature adopted the reasoning that “[twenty-five] 
small [marijuana] plants had the potential of growing into much larger plants, 
and therefore” possession could be prohibited.); see also Pease v. State, 27 P.3d 
788, 790 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001) (noting that state statutes “prohibit possession of 
25 or more plants of the genus cannabis.”). 
 255.  See, e.g., Noy, 83 P.3d at 543  (“We note, moreover, that article I, section 
22 [of the Alaska constitution] entrusts the legislature with the duty of 
implementing the constitional right of privacy. Given the language of article I, 
section 22, and given the deference that we should pay to the decision of a co-
equal branch of government, we conclude that the legislature’s four-ounce 
dividing line is presumptively constitutional under Ravin.”). 
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Such respect remains so long as any restrictions imposed by the 
Legislature adhere to the spirit of Ravin. 
B. Review Of The Scientific Evidence Underpinning Ravin Should 
Occur Before A Neutral Decision-Maker 
When it passed the 2006 marijuana prohibition legislation, the 
Alaska Legislature adopted one-sided findings that disregarded any 
evidence that was inconsistent with its predetermined position that 
marijuana use had become a significant public health threat in the time 
since Ravin was decided.256 These findings were hardly the result of 
scientific consensus. Expert witnesses testified against the legislation 
and submitted documentary evidence refuting many, if not all, of the 
state’s conclusions.257 This highlights one of the most important aspects 
of the Ravin decision: that the courts may be better suited than the 
legislature to accurately appraise marijuana’s characteristics. Accurate 
appraisal “is vital for ensuring that determinations on marijuana policy 
are informed by fact rather than ideology.”258 In Ravin, the district court, 
a neutral body without a political agenda, oversaw the initial 
presentation of evidence.259 The court conducted a “full evidentiary 
hearing concerning the effects of marijuana,” at which “much expert 
testimony was presented.”260 The Alaska Supreme Court then 
thoroughly reviewed the scientific evidence presented by the parties, 
including expert witness testimony on the health and social effects of 
marijuana use and numerous books and reports.261 
The hearings that took place in the Alaska Legislature prior to the 
 
 256.  The findings appeared to be predetermined—they were nearly identical 
to the proposed findings the Governor submitted prior to any testimony being 
heard and consisted of largely the same evidence the state had previously 
submitted to the Alaska Supreme Court in support of its petition for hearing in 
Noy. Compare S.B. 74 § 2, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2005), and H.B. 96 § 2, 24th 
Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2005), with Petition For Hearing at 6, State v. Noy, 
Supreme Court No. S-11297 (Jan. 5, 2004). 
 257.  See supra note 136 (summarizing legislative testimony on the 2006 
amendments). 
 258. Danovitch, supra note 132, at 108. 
 259. See Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524, 528 n.16 (Alaska 1974) (stating that Ravin 
had recently been granted petition for review by the Alaska Supreme Court 
following a full evidentiary hearing and presentation of expert testimony on the 
effects of marijuana at the lower court). 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504–10 (Alaska 1975) (summarizing in 
detail the expert testimony and written reports and books introduced into 
evidence at the district court); see also id. at 504 n.43 (listing a representative 
sampling of works examined by the court in addition to testimony from the 
district court). 
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passage of the 2006 amendments presented the opposite situation. The 
legislature conducted the hearings and the testimony occurred in a 
highly-politicized environment.262 Senator French complained about the 
lack of time available to testify, present evidence, and thoroughly 
discuss the Legislature’s findings, given the complex nature of the 
scientific evidence at issue.263 The precise setting in which decisions 
impacting constitutional law and civil liberties should not be finalized, 
as these types of decisions often involve unpopular and politically-
sensitive issues. Indeed, there may often be significant political 
motivation for a legislature to sacrifice constitutional principles in order 
to appease the electorate. Certainly the legislature is not precluded from 
considering evidence that impacts constitutional rights. But when laws 
impacting constitutional rights are based on legislative fact-finding, it is 
incumbent upon the judiciary to engage in a searching review of the 
evidence and not blindly defer to the legislature.264 That is why there is 
an established standard for judicial review of legislation that implicates 
fundamental rights. Though courts will generally defer to the 
determinations of the legislature, full deference to legislative fact-
finding is improper where legislative action concerns a constitutional 
right.265 
 
 262.  See Cockerham, supra note 108, at A1 (describing the political 
environment and sense of time pressure surrounding the marijuana bill). 
 263.  See H.B. 149, ALASKA S. CONF. COMM. 24th Leg. (Apr. 12, 2006) (statement 
of Senator Hollis French at 6:41:10 PM) (criticizing the time allotted to analyze 
and debate the marijuana issues addressed in the bill); see also Testimony of 
Doctor Lester Grinspoon, M.D., Associate Professor of Psychiatry at the Harvard 
Medical School, supra note 137; Testimony of Dr. Mitch Earleywine, Ph.D., 
Associate Professor of Psychology, University of Southern California, supra note 
137 (“I think that if this legislative body is as meticulous and comprehensive in 
collecting and assessing the data as these commissions were, it will have a better 
chance of arriving at a sound judgment about whether the harmfulness of 
marijuana is sufficient to enact such a restrictive bill.”). 
 264.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997) (holding 
Congress has been given the power to “enforce,” not the power to determine 
what constitutes a constitutional violation); Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 
1237 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)) (“It is . . . the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 265.  Valley Hosp. Assoc., Inc., v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 972 
(Alaska 1997); see also State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 4 (Alaska 1978) (holding that 
appellate courts may look outside the record “where the validity of legislation 
having major social consequences is at stake”); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 
(“When the political branches of the Government act against the background of 
a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be 
understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its 
precedents with the respect due them.”); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 
428, 437 (2000) (“Congress may not legislatively supersede our [constitutional] 
decisions.”); Cleland v. State, 759 P.2d 553, 557 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (stating 
that Ravin was about protecting the sanctity of the home under the privacy 
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This practice was evident in Ravin itself. Even though the court 
specified that it would not “reassess the scientific evidence in the 
manner of a legislature,” it still took a very close look at the evidence 
and did not defer to the presumption in favor of public health 
measures.266 Typically, “when there is substantial doubt as to the safety 
of a given substance or situation for the public health, controls intended 
to obviate the danger will usually be up-held.”267 Yet, with respect to the 
state’s control of marijuana use in the home, the court held the state to a 
much higher standard because of the privacy rights involved.268 
In the future, if the Alaska Supreme Court is presented with a ripe 
challenge to the continuing vitality of Ravin, the court should make a 
similar searching inquiry into the full record and review the evidence 
independently before it considers the factors of stare decisis and 
determines the continuing vitality of the Ravin decision. The court’s first 
step should be to determine whether there is sufficient evidence in the 
record developed below to even consider whether or not to overturn 
Ravin.269 If the court believes the record is insufficient, it can remand the 
matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. Alternatively, the 
court could limit the proceedings below by remanding with instructions 
for the trial court judge to appoint a discovery master to oversee the 
submission of evidence on specific questions relating to the social and 
health effects of marijuana.270 The court may also choose to forgo an 
evidentiary hearing entirely, especially if there was extensive 
documentary evidence submitted in the lower court. In such a case, 
 
clause and not about the use of marijuana). 
 266.  Ravin, 537 P.2d at 505 n.44. 
 267.  Id. at 510. 
 268.  Id. at 511 (“[M]ere scientific doubts will not suffice. The state must 
demonstrate a need based on proof that the public health or welfare will in fact 
suffer if the controls are not applied.”). 
 269.  For example, in ACLU  of Alaska v. State, the court considered scientific 
journals, books, testimony, expert declarations, statements of disputed facts, and 
numerous expert declarations. No. IJU-06-793 CI, 2006 WL 6457870, at *11–12 
(Alaska Super. Ct. July 10, 2006). 
 270. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 53 (discussing generally the procedural rules 
regarding the appointment, powers, and proceedings for masters); Peter v. 
Progressive Corp., 986 P.2d 865, 870 (Alaska 1999) (“[A]ppointment of a 
discovery master should generally be reserved for cases (1) where the issues are 
unusually complex or specialized; (2) where discovery is particularly document 
intensive; (3) where resolving discovery disputes will be especially time 
consuming; (4) where the parties are particularly contentious or obstructionist; 
or (5) where a master will facilitate a more speedy and economical 
determination of the case.”); McRae v. State, 909 P.2d 1079, 1082 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1996) (“[T]he appellate courts often remand factual issues to the trial 
courts, and the trial courts often appoint masters to make factual determinations 
necessary to the courts’ ultimate legal rulings.”). 
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where there will be “literally hundreds of scientific articles and 
numerous experts . . . it is questionable whether such an expanded 
hearing would reveal more reliable or higher quality information than is 
available by referring to authorities submitted in briefs by both sides, 
and, in appropriate cases, by additional research at the appellate 
level.”271 
A challenge to the constitutionality of the state’s criminal marijuana 
laws would also deal mainly with “legislative facts” as opposed to 
“adjudicative facts.”272 Legislative facts do not relate directly to the 
happenings in a particular case—to the parties or their actions—but to 
more general matters that influence policy decisions, such as social, 
political, economic, or scientific knowledge.273 When legislative facts are 
at the fore, it may be appropriate for the court to conduct its own 
research and consider sources outside the record.274 This would be an 
unusual step, but a court may be compelled to do so in order to 
adequately understand the background issues at play in cases “where 
the validity of legislation having major social consequences is at 
stake.”275 
C. Benchmarks for Gauging the State’s Interest in Restricting 
Private Marijuana Use 
To gauge the state’s interest required to justify restrictions on an 
adult’s private activities in the home, it is helpful to review how Alaska 
courts have addressed laws that restrict other intoxicating substances. 
Indeed, that is precisely what the Ravin court did. The court did not 
view the social and health effects of marijuana in a vacuum, but rather 
as compared to the harms posed by other substances. The court found 
that the “effects of marijuana on the individual are not serious enough to 
justify widespread concern, at least as compared with the far more 
dangerous effects of alcohol, barbiturates and amphetamines.”276 
Tellingly, several years later, Alaska appellate courts would rule that the 
state constitution did not protect personal use and possession of cocaine, 
alcohol, or tobacco.277 
 
 271.  State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 6 (Alaska 1978). 
 272.  Erickson, 574 P.2d at 5. 
 273.  Id. at 5–6. 
 274.  See id. at 4–6 (discussing generally the expanded scope of appellate 
review beyond the record when legislative facts are at issue). 
 275.  Id. at 4. 
 276.  Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 509–10 (Alaska 1975). 
 277.  See Fraternal Order of Eagles v. City and Borough of Juneau, 254 P.3d 
348, 358 (Alaska 2011) (holding a city and borough’s ordinance prohibiting 
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In State v. Erickson,278 the Alaska Supreme Court applied the Ravin 
standard to cocaine use and found that “criminalization of the personal 
use and possession  of cocaine in the home does not constitute an invalid 
infringement on the right to privacy.”279 The Court relied on well-
documented evidence that the nature and effects of cocaine made it 
“substantially more of a threat to health and welfare” than marijuana 
because “cocaine can cause death as a direct effect of the 
pharmacological action of the drug” and “cocaine certainly has some 
potential for producing crime and violence.”280 Similarly in Harrison v. 
State,281 the Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of Alaska’s 
Local Option laws that allow jurisdictions to prohibit the importation of 
alcohol.282 The court upheld the local option law at issue because “the 
evidence showing the harmful effects of [alcohol] consumption is 
undisputed” and “[t]he threat posed to society by widespread alcohol 
use is enormous.”283 And more recently, in Fraternal Order of Eagles v. 
City and Borough of Juneau,284 the Alaska Supreme Court found a close 
and substantial relationship between protecting the public from the 
harmful effects of tobacco smoke and banning smoking in a private club 
because “[t]he toll of death and injury caused by consumption of 
tobacco is not subject to serious dispute.”285 
To the courts in Erickson, Harrison, and Fraternal Order of Eagles, the 
harm to public health and welfare was well-documented and largely 
undisputed. In light of the standard established in Ravin and those 
subsequent rulings, the Alaska Supreme Court should not sustain a law 
proscribing all marijuana use and possession unless it finds that 
marijuana is now as harmful to both individual health and society in 
 
smoking in private clubs did not violate right to privacy under the State 
Constitution); Erickson, 574 P.2d at 5; Harrison v. State, 687 P.2d 332, 339 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1984) (holding local option law prohibiting sale and importation of 
alcohol did not violate State Constitution where the enactment bore a close and 
substantial relationship to the goal of protecting the public health and welfare). 
 278.   574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978). 
 279. Id. at 23. 
 280. Id. at 16–18, 21–22. 
 281.   687 P.2d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984). 
 282. See id. at 335 (stating that Harrison is challenging the constitutionality of 
Alaska’s local option law). The right to consume alcohol was not directly at 
issue; the challenged law did not prohibit the use of alcoholic beverages in the 
home. Id. at 338. 
 283.  Id. at 339. 
 284.  254 P.3d 348 (Alaska 2011). 
 285.  Id. at 358. Although the case did not deal with tobacco use in the home, 
in 2011 the Alaska Supreme Court found that the City and Borough of Juneau 
had “a legitimate interest in protecting the public, non-smokers and smokers 
alike, from the well-established dangers of second-hand tobacco smoke.” Id. at 
359. 
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ways similar to alcohol, cocaine, or tobacco.286 But determining exactly 
how marijuana compares to other substances is complicated; each 
carries its own unique harms, both to the user and the public at large. 
Application of a method such as multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA), 
a holistic approach to measuring the appropriateness or effectiveness of 
a system, could simplify this process and provide for a more 
quantitative-based comparison between substances.287 Such an approach 
is especially useful when analyzing controlled substances because of 
“the wide range in ways that drugs can cause harm.”288 
Without describing it as such, the courts in Ravin, Erickson, and 
Harrison essentially followed a MCDA-like approach by considering a 
variety of harm factors related to marijuana, cocaine, and alcohol. In 
each of those cases the courts weighed some combination of the 
following criteria: 
 Number of users and rate of consumption among various 
populations 
 Short and long term physical effects on the user 
 Short and long term psychological effects on the user 
 Mortality rate due to usage 
 Level of physical addictiveness 
 Level of psychological dependency 
 Potential for abuse 
 Correlation between use and criminal behavior 
 Correlation between use and domestic violence and child 
abuse 
 Propensity for use to incite violent, aggressive behavior 
 Effect on adolescents 
 Effect on driving an automobile 
 Economic cost of abuse and addiction289 
These criteria were included among those used in a 2010 study by 
Nutt, et al., that employed MCDA to assess 20 different substances along 
16 different harm criteria, distinguishing between specifically-identified 
harms to the user and harms to others.290 That study provides an easy-
to-follow framework for a court to use to consider the relative harms to 
 
 286. See Harrison, 687 P.2d at 338 (stating that the court in Erickson expressly 
found that alcohol is a more dangerous drug than both marijuana and cocaine). 
 287. See Jennifer Kuzma, Pouya Najmaie & Joel Larson, Evaluating Oversight 
Systems for Emerging Technologies: A Case Study of Genetically Engineered 
Organisms, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 546, 551 (2009) (“MCDA relies on the notion 
that no single outcome metric can capture the appropriateness or effectiveness of 
a system, allows for integrating heterogeneous information, and enables 
incorporation of expert and stakeholder judgments.”). 
 288. David Nutt et al., Drug Harms in the UK: A Multicriteria Decision Analysis, 
376 LANCET 1558, 1558 (2010). 
 289. Erickson, 574 P.2d at 8–11; Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 506–11 (Alaska 
1975); Harrison, 687 P.2d at 335–38. 
 290. Nutt et al., supra note 288, at 1558. 
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both individuals and society from use of any drug.291 And like the 
Alaska courts,292 Nutt ultimately found that marijuana was less harmful 
overall than alcohol, cocaine, or tobacco, though still not completely 
benign.293 
A key aspect of the MCDA approach used in the 2010 study was 
that it carefully distinguished the harms to the individual user from the 
harms to society as a whole. This is particularly relevant with respect to 
marijuana regulation in Alaska because of the strong individual privacy 
rights at stake. The Ravin court was quite frustrated with the State’s 
“assumption that [it] has the authority to protect the individual from his 
own folly, that is, that the State can control activities which present no 
harm to anyone except those enjoying them.” 294 Notwithstanding the 
accuracy of Nutt, et al.’s finding, or its applicability to drug usage 
patterns in Alaska, the MCDA approach used yielded a direct 
quantitative comparison of drugs based on their harm to users versus 
their harm to others, as well as based on their overall weighted scores 
for each of the identified harm criteria.295  Such a formalized MCDA 
approach would be very useful for the Alaska Supreme Court should it 
have occasion to revisit Ravin, or to review restrictions on any other 
controlled substance.296 It would allow the court to more accurately 
refine the spectrum of drug restrictions under Alaska law. 
D. The Relationship Between Marijuana Odor And Probable Cause 
Remains Contested 
In State v. Crocker, the Alaska Court of Appeals ruled that the smell 
of marijuana alone was not sufficient probable cause to search a home 
 
 291. Id. at 1559 fig.1; see id. at 1560 for definitions of the criteria. 
 292. See, e.g., State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 9 (Alaska 1978) (“Unlike marijuana, 
cocaine can cause death as a direct effect of its pharmacological action.”). 
 293. See Nutt et al., supra note 288, at 1561 fig.2 (assigning alcohol, cocaine, 
and tobacco overall harm scores of 72, 27, and 26, respectively while cannabis 
received an overall harm score of 20). 
 294. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 508. 
 295. Nutt et al., supra note 288, at 1561. 
 296.  For example, the Municipality of Anchorage recently banned synthetic 
cannabinoid drugs, commonly known as “K2” or “Spice.”  Rosemary Shinohara, 
Assembly Outlaws Chemical Known as ‘Synthetic Marijuana,’ ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, Dec. 18, 2010, available at http://www.adn.com/2010/12/08/v-
printer/1594268/assembly-outlaws-street-chemical.html. Though it is often 
referred to as “synthetic marijuana,” these substances do not contain any THC, 
the active ingredient in marijuana, but both are considered cannabinoids 
because they both attach themselves to the cannabinoid receptors in the brain. 
Roland Macher et al., Synthetic Marijuana, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, May 
2012, available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-
enforcement-bulletin/may-2012/synthetic-marijuana. 
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for evidence of illegal marijuana-related activity.297 The court did not 
disregard the possibility that there was a correlation between the 
strength of marijuana odor and the amount of marijuana giving rise to 
that odor, but it would “not simply assume that there is a direct 
proportionality” in the absence of any supporting evidence.298 Following 
Crocker, Alaska law enforcement officials began making an effort to 
document that correlation and to establish that the smell of growing 
marijuana outside of a structure is evidence that there is an illegal 
amount of marijuana inside the structure. In affidavits submitted in 
support of search warrants in several cases, officers have stated that 
“just smelling the odor of cultivating marijuana on the outside air is 
indicative of a commercial grow operation”299 and that they cannot 
smell “personal-use quantities of marijuana in the air outside a residence 
because there is not enough plant material to generate the odor.”300 They 
have also presented statistical evidence to support this “smell test” 
theory: eighty-one of the marijuana grows seized by the Alaska State 
Trooper’s Matanuska-Susitna Drug Enforcement Unit (AST Mat-Su 
Drug Unit) from 2000 to 2004 were discovered by officers smelling 
growing marijuana, and in 96% of those seizures, a “felony level grow 
operation was discovered.”301 
 
 297.  97 P.3d 93, 96–97; see generally supra notes 95–106 and accompanying text 
(discussing Crocker decision). 
 298.  Id. at 97. 
 299.  United States v. Thoms, 788 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1005 (D. Alaska 2011), 
vacated on other grounds and remanded, 684 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2012). According to 
these affidavits, “the ability to smell the odor of cultivating marijuana outside a 
building is, by itself, indicative of a commercial grow operation because it 
typically indicates the use of an installed air venting system.” State v. Smith, 182 
P.3d 651, 654 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008); see also Cavitt v. State, No. A-10480, 2011 
WL 5428968, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2011) (relying in part on testimony 
that personal grow operations do not need to vent excessive heat and thus the 
odor of growing marijuana is not transferred outside); Nelson v. State, No. A-
10113, 2009 WL 2092450, at *6 (Alaska Ct. App. July 15, 2009) (considering 
trooper’s observation of a vent hole as a factor when determining if the grow 
operation was commercial or personal). 
 300.  Rofkar v. State, No. A-10383, 2011 WL 746439, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Mar. 2, 2011), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 273 P.3d 1140 (Alaska 2012). 
 301.  Smith, 182 P.3d at 654; Nelson, 2009 WL 2092450, at *6 (officer reported 
smelling strong odor of freshly grown marijuana); Rofkar, 2011 WL 746439, at *1 
(relying on affidavits from officer explaining that in the previous four years his 
drug unit had eighty-one cases arising from officers smelling the odor of 
cultivating marijuana and that of these, ninety-six percent involved felony-level 
grow operations); Thoms, 788 F. Supp. 2d. at 1004 (relying on affidavits from 
officer who smelled a “strong odor of cultivating marijuana while driving”); 
Starkey v. State, 272 P.3d 347, 348 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012) (relying, in addition to 
other indicia, on odor of growing marijuana while standing in the yard). A 
“felony level grow operation” refers to a grow consisting of more than four 
ounces of marijuana or more than 25 plants.  ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.040(a)(3)(G) 
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Three published opinions have discussed these data. In State v. 
Smith,302 the Alaska Court of Appeals found that these statistics, along 
with the investigator’s assertion of a “moderate odor” of growing 
marijuana coming from inside the structure and information about the 
officer’s experience in smelling felony-level marijuana grow operations, 
established probable cause because when combined they “linked his 
ability to smell marijuana from the driveway of Smith’s property to a 
probability that the mobile home contained evidence of a commercial 
grow of marijuana.”303 But the defendant challenged the validity of the 
statistical analysis, arguing that the statistics cited were “unreliable 
because the data consists only of those instances in which the police 
ultimately seized the marijuana they smelled” and the data did “not 
specify whether and how many times [the investigator’s] unit smelled 
cultivating marijuana but did not seize it because the grows were not 
commercial grows.”304  The Court of Appeals did not address the 
validity of the data, but did note that at trial the defendant had not had a 
formal opportunity to review the data or to determine the extent to 
which the data influenced the magistrate’s decision to issue the 
warrant.305 The court remanded the case in order to give the defendant 
an opportunity to discover if there were flaws in the statistical analysis 
or misstatements that would undercut the finding of probable cause.306 
The subsequent proceedings did not produce any reported findings on 
the quality of that statistical analysis.307 
The same analysis was debated three years later in United States v. 
Thoms.308 In that case the data was presented as a study that purported 
to prove that “96% of the time, when an officer smells marijuana on the 
outside air, there is more than four ounces of marijuana present.”309 The 
court was not convinced by this evidence and found the study 
“statistically flawed.”310  One year later, in Starkey v. State,311 the Court of 
 
(2012). 
 302.  182 P.3d 651 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008). 
 303.  Id. at 652–54. 
 304.  Id. 
 305.  Id. at 655. 
 306.  Id. 
 307.  State v. Fucci, No. A-9863, 2008 WL 5025423, at *1–2 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Nov. 26, 2008). 
 308.  788 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1015 (D. Alaska 2011) vacated on other grounds and 
remanded, 684 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 309.  Id. at 1005. 
 310.  Id. The study was ultimately irrelevant to the outcome as the court 
identified numerous other problems with the facts upon which the search 
warrants were based. See id. at 1005–16. For example, the court expressed 
disbelief as to whether the officer could have smelled marijuana at all under the 
circumstances: “[Investigator] Young claimed to smell a strong odor of 
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Appeals held that these statistics were not “scientific” evidence subject 
to the Coons/Daubert standard for evaluating the admissibility of 
scientific evidence.312 The statistical analysis was viewed as “a report or 
summary of information accumulated by the Mat–Su drug unit through 
actual experience” and “rested on fairly straightforward mathematics—
and some implicit or unarticulated assumptions about the facts of the 81 
underlying cases.”313 This determination did not weigh on the ultimate 
outcome of the case. The court found that there was probable cause to 
believe Starkey was using his residence to grow marijuana in criminal 
quantities even without considering the statistical analysis.314 
It remains to be seen how much weight an Alaska court would 
place on such data if a scientifically and statistically valid study on 
marijuana odor was submitted as the only evidence in support of a 
search warrant application. In Smith the Court of Appeals found that the 
study helped cure the search warrant deficiencies that were present in 
Crocker, but the court ultimately remanded the case so the defendant 
could review (and potentially challenge) the accuracy of the data and 
determine the extent to which the issuing magistrate relied on it.315 
There is no other indication in the line of post-Crocker cases that 
statistical information alone would establish probable cause in this 
context. Rather, courts have been willing to accept the State’s data as 
part of the overall picture of probable cause regarding unlawful 
marijuana activity in the home—so long as additional factors evincing 
marijuana possession that exceeds the scope of what is protected under 
Ravin (none of which would necessarily establish probable cause on 
their own) are also present.316 
 
marijuana that could have only emanated from an enclosed building 
approximately 450 feet away. The building was equipped with a carbon 
filtration system. There was a two-story residence atop a hill and substantial 
vegetation obstructing the only possible source of odor. Young was in a moving 
vehicle with his driver’s side window partially down in February.” Id. at 1007. 
 311.  272 P.3d 347 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012). 
 312.  Id. at 353. 
 313.  Id. 
 314.  Id. (“even if this statistical analysis . . . were removed . . . the application 
would still provide probable cause for the search warrant.”); see also id. at 354 
(finding probable cause where (1) authorities received a tip from a confidential 
informant about a large number of marijuana plants growing in Starkey’s 
residence; (2) officers smelled growing marijuana at the residence; (3) officers 
heard noise from inside the house indicating the presence of electrical ballasts 
and/or ventilating fans; (4) the house was using an unusual amount of 
electricity; (5) a large number of buckets of the type used by marijuana growers 
were present; and (6) a 30-pound bag of growing medium was found). 
 315. State v. Smith, 182 P.3d 651, 654 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008). 
 316. See, e.g., Nelson v. State, No. A-10113, 2009 WL 2092450, *6 (Alaska Ct. 
App. July 15, 2009) (upholding search where officer smelled marijuana odor in 
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A recent report lends credence to the decision to consider 
marijuana odor as but one of many markers a judicial officer may 
consider when reviewing the “totality of circumstances” surrounding a 
search warrant application.317 In 2011 the Alaska State Troopers 
commissioned a more thorough and detailed review of its data on 
searches and the smell of marijuana on the open air.318 The report 
concluded that there is a positive correlation between the strength of 
marijuana odor emanating from a residence and the presence of large 
quantities (defined in the study as four or more ounces or 25 or more 
plants) of marijuana contained therein.319 In other words, based on these 
data, the detection of the odor of growing marijuana increased the 
likelihood that relatively large quantities of marijuana would be 
discovered. However, the report also found that the so-called “smell 
test” was a “suboptimal” means for detecting illegal quantities of 
marijuana.320 The “smell test” has a significant risk of producing false 
positives (conducting searches based on smell when large quantities are 
not present) and a high rate of false negatives (discovering large 
quantities of marijuana in the absence of odor detection).321 The report 
also cautioned that the “smell test” alone cannot be relied upon to 
accurately determine the precise amount of marijuana present within a 
structure.322 
 
addition to seeing a grow-light system, heard an electric humming consistent 
with electrical ballasts and fans, and excessive electricity usage). Other factors 
courts have considered include: a strong odor of marijuana during the nighttime 
(suggesting the type of venting that is involved with larger-scale marijuana 
grow operations), heavy foot traffic in and out of the residence, high use of 
electricity, evidence that the occupant of the residence was unemployed but had 
made several large purchases. See Rofkar v. State, No. A-10383, 2011 WL 746439, 
at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2011), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 273 
P.3d 1140 (Alaska 2012) (considering higher than normal electrical usage despite 
house being uninhabited as one indicia of a commercial grow operation). 
 317.  Burrece v. State, 976 P.2d 241, 243 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (stating that 
the test is flexible and considers the totality of circumstances). 
 318.  See generally BRAD A. MYSTROL & JASON BRANDEIS, THE PREDICTIVE 
VALIDITY OF MARIJUANA ODOR DETECTION: AN EXAMINATION OF ALASKA STATE 
TROOPER CASE REPORTS 2006–2010 (2012), available at 
justice.uaa.alaska.edu/research/2010/1110.02.ast.marijuana/1110.02.marijuana.
pdf. 
 319.  Id. at 51–52. 
 320.  Id. at 41. 
 321.  See id. at 41–42 (finding the false positive rate for the smell test to be 
51.5% and the false negative rate to be 83.1%). 
 322.  Id. at 51–52. The study identified several other limitations. First, the 
scope of the study was limited to the marijuana grow searches conducted by 
AST investigators from 2006–2010. Id. at 52. Inferences to other jurisdictions, 
different time periods, or another sampling universe cannot be made from these 
data. Id. Second, this was not a study of searches conducted solely because 
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IV: RAVIN CONTINUES TO PEACEFULLY COEXIST WITH 
THE CSA 
Many wonder about the relationship between Ravin and the federal 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA). This is not surprising considering the 
contrast between Ravin and the CSA has always been stark: personal use 
and possession of any amount of marijuana were illegal under the CSA 
when Ravin was decided and remain so today.323 Despite what appears 
at first blush to be a significant conflict—a federal law that conflicts with 
a state law will generally preempt the state law and render it “without 
effect”324—the right to personal use of marijuana created by Ravin is not 
 
investigators smelled marijuana. It was a study of the overall searches 
conducted, which included situations where officers smelled marijuana during 
those searches. This is important because the factors that gave rise to the search 
in the first place—other than marijuana odor—were always present in addition 
to the marijuana odor. Next, the source of the data for this study was archival—
it consisted of 333 case records written and submitted by AST investigators. Id. 
Any information not recorded, or ambiguities in the case reports, could not be 
clarified and were not included in the study. Id. at 52–53. Finally, the study was 
not inclusive of all factors that could influence search outcomes. For instance, the 
study did not account for attributes of the officers themselves, such as training 
and experience, or prior criminal history of suspected offenders. Id. at 53. In 
short, these findings are specific to a unique set of facts (a snapshot of a certain 
time and place) and should not be generalized to include all situations where 
law enforcement officers might smell marijuana. 
 323.  See The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2012) (“CSA”).  
The CSA contains a limited exception for marijuana possession for government-
approved and registered scientific research. §§ 822, 823. Federal marijuana 
crimes carry maximum prison sentences ranging from one year to life in prison 
and maximum fines ranging from one thousand dollars to eight million dollars, 
depending upon the amount of marijuana involved and the circumstances 
surrounding the conviction. §§ 841(b), 844(a). 
 324.  Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). There is also a 
strong presumption against federal preemption of state laws in areas 
traditionally regulated by the states, such as the police power. Burts v. Burts, 266 
P.3d 337, 343 (Alaska 2011) (courts “start with the assumption that the historic 
police powers of the State were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless 
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”); Allen v. State, Dep’t of 
Health & Soc. Servs., 203 P.3d 1155, 1160 (Alaska 2009) (“There is a presumption 
against federal preemption of state law. . . .”); Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 
1245 (Alaska 1977) (“There can be no question of the authority of the State in the 
exercise of its police power to regulate the administration, sale, prescription and 
use of dangerous and habit-forming drugs. . . .”); Belgarde v. State, 543 P.2d 206, 
208 (Alaska 1975) (holding that a state prohibition on possession of marijuana in 
the home is a valid exercise of the state’s police power for the public welfare); 
State v. Dupier, 118 P.3d 1039, 1049 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 
U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see also Native Vill. of Eklutna v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 87 P.3d 
41, 56 (Alaska 2004) (“In determining the scope of federal preemption, we start 
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
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preempted by the CSA and is consistent with longstanding notions of 
state sovereignty.325 
  Two overarching principles of federalism frame the relationship 
between Ravin and the CSA. First, states are never preempted from 
decriminalizing an activity just because it is prohibited by federal law. 
States have the sovereign right to determine the extent to which they 
will punish or not punish certain types of conduct. Second, it is well 
established that state constitutions can provide greater protection for 
individual rights than the United States Constitution.326 Ravin, which 
decriminalized a very thin slice of marijuana possession under the 
Alaska Constitution’s more robust right to privacy, fits squarely within 
this framework—so squarely that the opinion did not even mention 
preemption or the CSA.327 The federal preemption doctrine is simply not 
implicated by Ravin. Indeed, following Ravin, state courts have adhered 
to that view, never issuing an opinion on federal preemption of Alaska’s 
personal-use marijuana laws.328 As far as the courts are concerned, Ravin 
 
Congress.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 325.  This Section discusses marijuana possession in Alaska as permitted by 
Ravin and the right to privacy only, and not use permitted by Alaska’s medical 
marijuana law. ALASKA STAT. §§ 17.37.010–17.37.080 (2012). For a discussion on 
the applicability of the CSA to state medical marijuana laws, see D. Douglas 
Metcalf, Federal Supremacy and Arizona’s Medical Marijuana Act, 47 ARIZ. ATT’Y 22, 
23 (2011) (“Arizona’s new Medical Marijuana Act, which legalizes the 
distribution and use of marijuana for medical use in certain situations, has no 
bearing on whether such activities remain illegal under federal law.”); M. 
Wesley Clark, Can State “Medical” Marijuana Statutes Survive the Sovereign’s 
Federal Drug Laws? A Toke Too Far, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 8 (2005) (“It is clear that 
Congress views any state drug legalization attempts to be in conflict with and 
preempted by the CSA.”). 
 326.  Stephen McAllister, Individual Rights Under a System of Dual Sovereignty: 
The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 8, 71 (2011); See also Oregon v. 
Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (“[A] State is free as a matter of its own law to 
impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be 
necessary upon federal constitutional standards.”); Cooper v. California, 386 
U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (discussing a “State’s power to impose higher standards on 
searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to 
do so”); State v. Batts, 195 P.3d 144, 152 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he Alaska 
Constitution’s privilege against self-incrimination has been interpreted to 
impose greater restrictions on the government than the federal Fifth 
Amendment.”). 
 327.  See generally Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975). 
 328.  There are only two reported Alaska decisions where the CSA has even 
come up. In Brown v. Ely, the Court held that a violation of the right to possess 
marijuana under state law could not form the basis of a federal civil rights claim 
because the activity was prohibited by federal law “regardless of whether 
Alaska law provides additional protections.” 14 P.3d 257, 261 (Alaska 2000). See 
generally State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364 (Alaska 2009) (relying on the 
supremacy of the CSA and the risk of federal prosecution to justify its decision 
to abstain from ruling on the merits of the parties’ claims). Federal courts also 
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and the CSA can peacefully coexist. A closer look at state sovereignty 
and the Tenth Amendment bears out why this is so. 
States are not obligated to regulate and penalize drug use at all, but 
they can, and do, craft laws consistent with their own “social norms and 
personal preferences.”329 The Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering 
rule precludes the federal government from forcing states to pass 
coexistent, or even complimentary, controlled substance laws, or from 
forcing states to enforce federal drug laws.330  These states’ rights are 
very clear in Alaska, where the state and the federal government diverge 
significantly in how they view the hazards of marijuana use and how 
they choose to punish it. Alaska has historically rated marijuana offenses 
as among the least serious of all drug offenses and continues to classify 
it as a Schedule VIA substance—a drug with the lowest degree of 
danger to a person or the public.331 Conversely, under the CSA 
marijuana is listed as a Schedule I controlled substance because it has “a 
high potential for abuse,” “no currently accepted medical use in 
treatment,” and “a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other 
substance under medical supervision.”332  Penalties for simple 
possession under state law are also lower than under federal law.333 
Finally, of course, there is Ravin, which prohibits the State of Alaska 
 
appear to be silent on the issue of preemption with regard to Ravin. 
 329.  Alex Kreit, Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on Federal Drug Laws in 
an Age of State Reforms, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 555, 571 (2010). 
 330.  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution 
has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the 
States to govern according to Congress’ instructions”); Printz v. United States, 
521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot compel states to enact or 
enforce a federal regulatory program); Robert A. Mikos, On The Limits Of 
Supremacy: Medical Marijuana And The States’ Overlooked Power To Legalize Federal 
Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1446 (2009) (“The preemption power is constrained 
by the Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering rule. That rule stipulates that 
Congress may not command state legislatures to enact laws nor order state 
officials to administer them.”). State officials and local police officers may, 
however, enforce federal drug laws on their own volition. Gonzales v. City of 
Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that concurrent enforcement 
activity is authorized where state enforcement does not impair federal 
regulatory interests). 
 331.  Waters v. State, 483 P.2d 199, 201 (Alaska 1971) (finding an absence of 
foundation for characterization of marijuana offender as the worst type of drug 
offender for sentencing purposes); ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.190(a), (b) (2012). 
 332.  21 U.S.C. § 812, (b)(1)(A)–(C), (c) (2012). 
 333.  Compare ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.040 (2012) (making simple possession of 
four ounces or more a Class C Felony), and § 12.55.125(e) (limiting punishment 
for a Class C Felony to five years), with 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2012) (providing for 
penalties of life in prison and fines of eight million dollars depending upon the 
amount of marijuana involved and the circumstances surrounding the 
conviction. 
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from penalizing adults who possess a small amount of marijuana in 
their homes for personal use, a protection that does not exist under 
federal law. However, application of the CSA in Alaska is actually 
consistent with Ravin: federal prosecutors are not concerned with 
possession of small amounts of marijuana in private residences.334 The 
risk of federal prosecution for conduct protected by Ravin is therefore 
extremely low.335 
The existence of different state and federal rubrics for regulating 
and punishing (or not punishing) marijuana-related activity is not 
unusual or problematic. In approximately sixteen states (as well as a 
number of municipalities), simple possession of a small amount of 
marijuana leaves one subject to, at most, a minor civil fine,336 whereas 
 
 334.  The Criminal Division of the United States Attorney’s Office for the 
District of Alaska does not include simple marijuana possession among its 
prosecutorial priorities. See State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 377 n.19 
(Alaska 2009) (enumerating ten priorities: (1) protecting the United States from 
terrorist attack; (2) protecting this country from foreign intelligence operations 
and espionage; (3) protecting this country from cyber-based attacks and high-
technology crimes; (4) combating public corruption; (5) protecting civil rights; (6) 
combating transnational and national criminal organizations and enterprises; (7) 
combating major white-collar crime; (8) combating significant violent crime; (9) 
supporting federal, state, local, and international partners; and (10) upgrading 
technology to succeed in the FBI mission); Criminal, THE UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, DISTRICT OF ALASKA, http://www.justice.gov/usao 
/ak/criminal.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). The Division prosecutes mainly 
felony offenses and its misdemeanor docket consists of “cases involving more 
minor offense[s] and violations occurring in Alaska’s many amazing federal 
parks, national forests and federal lands.” ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d at 377 n.19. 
This would exclude prosecution of adults who possessed small amounts of 
marijuana in their homes for personal use; simple possession of marijuana is a 
misdemeanor under the CSA. State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d at 377 n.19 
(“Prosecutions of persons in their homes for misdemeanor marijuana possession 
would appear not to fall within the described activities.”). 
 335.  In his dissent in State v. ACLU of Alaska, Justice Carpeneti noted that “the 
United States brought zero misdemeanor drug possession cases in Alaska in 
fiscal year 2005 and less than ten cases each year in fiscal year 2006 and fiscal 
year 2007.” 204 P.3d at 376–77 (Carpeneti, J. dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 336.  Fourteen states (Alaska, California, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,  
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oregon, and Rhode Island) have decriminalized recreational marijuana use. See 
Places that Have Decriminalized Non-Medical Cannabis in the United States, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Places_that_have_decriminalized_ 
non-medical_cannabis_in_the_United_States  (last modified Nov. 20, 2012); 
Jennifer R. Donnelly, Commentary, The Need for Ibogaine in Drug and Alcohol 
Addiction Treatment, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 93, 112 (2011) (identifying twelve states 
that have decriminalized marijuana). Two other states, Colorado and 
Washington, have legalized such activity. Jack Healy, Voters Ease Marijuana Laws 
in 2 States, but Legal Questions Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at P15, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/ politics/marijuana-laws-eased-in-
colorado-and-washington.html. 
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federal law allows for a prison term for the same offense.337 There are 
many other examples of state laws that permit conduct proscribed by 
the federal government.338 These laws may not be perfectly in sync with 
federal law, but neither are they preempted solely because of their more 
restrictive federal counterparts. To find otherwise would upend the 
Tenth Amendment by nullifying sovereign state decisions that are 
inconsistent with federal objectives. It would be a backdoor way of 
forcing states to enact laws that mimicked federal statutes. 
Alaska’s personal use marijuana law was created through 
independent judicial interpretation of the Alaska Constitution’s right to 
privacy. The State of Alaska, whether via its legislative, executive, or 
judicial branch, is not required to march in lockstep with federal drug 
policy. Ravin and the CSA continue to peacefully coexist: Ravin merely 
limits the ability of the State of Alaska to criminalize certain marijuana-
related conduct that occurs within the privacy of the home. It does 
nothing to impact federal enforcement of the CSA on Alaskan soil.339 It 
does not abrogate the ability of federal officials to enforce the CSA, nor 
does it shield Alaskans from federal criminal charges.340 
 
 337.  21 U.S.C. § 844 (2012). 
 338.  Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S 241, 290 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that 
“countless . . . federal criminal provisions . . . [prohibit] conduct that happens to 
not be forbidden under state law”); see also Hyland v. Fukuda, 580 F.2d 977, 980–
81 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that Hawaii law exempting state employees from 
Hawaii law prohibiting possession of a firearm by certain felons was not 
preempted by federal law with no such exemption); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-
27.1 (2012) (exempting from state criminal prohibition the possession of a 
controlled substance by an individual who needs medical assistance due to a 
drug overdose, as well as by an individual who seeks medical assistance for a 
person experiencing an overdose); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3302A (2012) (not 
criminalizing the purchase of handguns to individuals ages eighteen through 
twenty-one even though federal law proscribes handgun purchases for 
individuals aged eighteen through twenty-one, 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) (2012); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 5-14-110(a) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-90a(a) (2012); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 11 § 1112A(a)(3) (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 259 (2012); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 21.750(2) (2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-320.02 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
14-202.3 (2012); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.06 (a)(2) (West 2012); WIS. STAT. § 
948.075 (2012). 
 339.  ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d at 370 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld the supremacy of the federal drug laws over state medical marijuana 
laws in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10 (2005)); Brown v. Ely, 14 P.3d 257, 260–
61 (Alaska 2000) (holding that additional protections under state law are 
subordinate to federal law where the right protected by state law is expressly 
prohibited by federal law). 
 340.  Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375 (“The elements of, and the defenses 
to, a federal cause of action are defined by federal law.”). However, Ravin could 
be seen as fostering uncooperative behavior with federal drug policy: that 
“roughly 99% of all marijuana arrests are made by state and local officials” 
indicates that “federal anti-drug policy is meant to be a joint undertaking 
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CONCLUSION 
The debate over the legality of marijuana in Alaska continues, and 
Ravin v. State remains at its center. During the past thirty-seven years, 
the Alaska Legislature has partially embraced (in 1975), fully embraced 
(in 1982), and then completely rejected (in 2006), Ravin’s core holding. 
Voters of the state have been similarly inconsistent, choosing to 
recriminalize all marijuana possession (in 1990), then to decriminalize 
possession for medical use (in 1998), then to reject further 
decriminalization efforts (in 2000 and 2004). The courts, however, have 
remained steadfast, never veering from the landmark precedent 
established in 1975. This is not surprising. Political winds shift and the 
opinions of voters change, but stare decisis, a court’s duty to abide by and 
adhere to prior decisions, remains the backbone of our legal system. 
It is against that backdrop that Ravin retains its vitality. No 
subsequent Alaska Supreme Court decision has weakened its holding, 
nor indicated that the court would overrule itself. Rather, a number of 
trial courts, the Alaska Court of Appeals, and the Alaska Supreme Court 
have consistently affirmed Ravin’s interpretation of the Alaska 
Constitution’s right to privacy: that the interest of the State of Alaska in 
regulating the personal use of marijuana in the home by adults was not 
sufficient to overcome the fundamental right to privacy. 
Ravin and its progeny remain intact as the controlling precedents in 
the state. Accordingly, Alaskans can currently lawfully possess up to 
four ounces of marijuana in their homes for personal use, but still risk 
prosecution under existing state and federal statutes. Though that risk is 
mitigated by the policies currently employed by both the Alaska 
Department of Law and the United States Department of Justice: the 
state has a policy in place against prosecuting conduct that falls within 
the scope of Ravin and small, non-commercial marijuana cases are not a 
priority for the federal government. 
If the state does shift course and begins enforcing the new statutes, 
stare decisis commands that any state trial court that considers the 
statutes is bound to declare them unconstitutional and unenforceable to 
the extent they conflict with Ravin. Should the Alaska Supreme Court 
have occasion to revisit Ravin, there is a very high threshold that must 
be met before the Court could overturn the ruling, even in light of 
 
between federal and state officials . . . . Hence, states that have legalized 
marijuana are acting uncooperatively in what is supposed to be a cooperative 
task, i.e., the enforcement of marijuana laws in violation of federal law.” Berkley, 
supra note 60, at 436–37 (quoting Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, 
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1283–84 (2009)). 
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current marijuana potency and usage patterns; there must be clear 
scientific proof that public health and welfare will in fact suffer if private 
marijuana use by adults is not prohibited. Unless and until that is 
proven to the Alaska Supreme Court, Ravin retains its vitality and 
Alaskans can continue to maintain a high level of privacy in their 
homes. 
